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Syntactic Structures as Descriptions of
Sensorimotor Processes
Alistair Knott
In this paper I propose a hypothesis linking elements of a model of theo-
retical syntax with neural mechanisms in the domain of sensorimotor pro-
cessing. The syntactic framework I adopt to express this linking hypothesis
is Chomsky’s Minimalism: I propose that the language-independent Logical
Form (LF) of a sentence reporting a concrete episode in the world can be in-
terpreted as a detailed description of the sensorimotor processes involved
in apprehending that episode. The hypothesis is motivated by a detailed
study of one particular episode, in which an agent grasps a target object.
There are striking similarities between the LF structure of transitive sen-
tences describing this episode and the structure of the sensorimotor processes
through which it is apprehended by an observer. The neural interpretation
of Minimalist LF structure allows it to incorporate insights from empiricist
accounts of syntax, relating to sentence processing and to the learning of syn-
tactic constructions.
Keywords: embodied cognition; generative syntax; neural models of language;
reaching-to-grasp; sensorimotor processing
1 Two Strategies for Investigating the Neural Correlates of Syntax
At least since Chomsky’s Aspects (Chomsky, 1965), it has been traditional for lin-
guists to think of syntactic models as describing something in the domain of psy-
chology, rather than just as characterising sets of well-formed sentences. In prac-
tice, theoretical linguists rarely try to express the detailed claims of their models
in terms which would be intelligible to neuroscientists or experimental psychol-
ogists. However, if a syntactic theory really does describe the cognitive system,
then ultimately we might expect the theoretical devices it employs (representing
syntactic structures or operations) to correspond to brain mechanisms which are
identifable in their own right. For instance, if a theory uses a particular device
to represent how phrases are formed, or how long-distance syntactic dependen-
cies are sanctioned, we might expect to be able to find a mechanism in the brain
which ‘implements’ the device, and ultimately explains why it has a role to play
in the overall theory. The mechanism should be independently identifiable using
the techniques available to neuroscience. Neuroscience is maturing rapidly; there
are now many well-established methods for investigating brain structures and pro-
cesses at several levels of hierarchy. So eventually we might expect to be able to
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express a hypothesis linking terminology or devices from syntactic theory to iden-
tifiable brain mechanisms.
Poeppel and Embick (2005) provide a useful discussion of this expectation.
They argue that it is not a foregone conclusion: that some syntactic theories are
expressed at a level of detail which is unlikely ever to correspond to measurable
observations in neuroscience. In order to move towards a linking hypothesis, they
suggest that syntactic theories should be formulated in ways that highlight the gen-
eral classes of computation which must be carried out by the syntactic system—and
to seek theories in which the proposed types of computation are plausibly imple-
mentable by neural machinery. It is not clear what syntactic formalisms Poeppel
and Embick intend to rule out through this proposal, but it is certainly helpful for
a theory to be explicit about the general types of computation which the syntactic
mechanism must be capable of, and to focus the search for a linking hypothesis on
a search for neural mechanisms which can implement computations with the right
properties.
There is another strategy for seeking brain mechanisms underlying syntactic
devices, which is in some ways complementary to that proposed by Poeppel and
Embick: namely to focus the search for a linking hypothesis on the semantic do-
mains which have been most intensively studied within neuroscience. Promising
areas of neuroscience to consider are those which study perceptual and motor
mechanisms (which I shall refer to jointly as ‘sensorimotor’ mechanisms). Models
of sensorimotor mechanisms are among the most detailed in neuroscience, because
it is through these mechanisms that the brain interfaces with the world, and they
are therefore the easiest to study empirically. If we want to look for neural mech-
anisms underlying a particular syntactic structure, it may be helpful to begin by
studying examples of the structure featuring concepts with obvious links to sen-
sorimotor mechanisms, rather than concepts taken from some arbitrary semantic
domain. For instance, if we are interested in the neural mechanisms underlying
predication, it might be helpful to look first at ‘concrete’ sentences like The cat is
white rather than arbitrary predications like The idea is popular or The company is
solvent. We know quite a lot about the neural mechanisms involved in perceiving
concrete objects and properties, so if we begin with The cat is white, we have a point
to start from on the neuroscience side.
The idea of focussing on concrete language is central to a recent programme
of research in psychology and neuroscience, investigating the claim that language
somehow supervenes on, or recruits, sensorimotor mechanisms (see e.g. Rizzolatti
and Arbib, 1998; Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan and Taylor; 2006; Pulvermu¨ller,
2010; Meteyard et al., 2012). These claims form part of a broader ‘embodied’ concep-
tion of cognition which is currently quite influential in cognitive science (Barsalou,
2008). Of course a hypothesis about the neural mechanisms underlying syntax
must eventually extend beyond concrete sentences to all sentences. If we look first
at concrete sentences, we must remember that we are looking in the sensorimotor
domain for instantiations of general neural mechanisms, which we expect to also
find in other more abstract domains. But it may still be helpful to start by studying
concrete sensorimotor domains.
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2 A Project Which Combines the Two Strategies
In this paper, I will summarise a research project which pursues both of the strate-
gies outlined above. The aim of the project is to suggest how the devices of a formal
syntactic theory can be linked to neural mechanisms. In line with the second strat-
egy just discussed, the project focusses on sentences in a concrete domain, which
express propositions that could conceivably be apprehended through well-studied
sensorimotor processes. In line with the first strategy, the syntactic formalism used
to analyse these sentences is one which emphasises simple computations, for which
there is some prospect of a neural implementation.
The project focusses on a single example episode: one in which a man reaches
for and grasps a cup. The sensorimotor mechanisms involved in experiencing this
episode have been particularly closely studied, so it is possible to formulate a fairly
detailed model of the processing that takes place when it is apprehended. On the
syntactic side, the project focusses on the sentences which most directly report this
example episode: transitive sentences such as The man grabs the cup, He grabs it,
L’homme prend la tasse, L’homme le prend and so on.1 My aim is to juxtapose a de-
tailed model of the sensorimotor processes needed to apprehend the cup-grabbing
episode against a model of the syntax of the example sentences, and look for for-
mal similarities between the two models. If there are nontrivial similarities, this
might provide some insight about how syntax reflects sensorimotor mechanisms,
and ultimately, how syntax supervenes on neural mechanisms more generally.
The project is described at length in a recently published book (Knott, 2012).
The book introduces both the sensorimotor and syntactic models ‘from scratch’,
since there are few readers who are familiar with the details of both fields: as a re-
sult the key ideas are interspersed with a large amount of motivating background
material. The purpose of the current paper is to present the key ideas in the book
with a minimum of background material. I will begin in Section 3 by introducing
the syntactic model, which is a version of Chomsky’s Minimalism. In Section 4 I
will introduce the overall form of the sensorimotor model I adopt, and in Section 5
I describe the form of the correspondence between syntax and sensorimotor pro-
cessing which I envisage. In Sections 6 and 7 I introduce a detailed model of the
sensorimotor processing through which a cup-grabbing episode is apprehended
and stored. In Section 8 I make some proposals about how the syntax of the ex-
ample sentences can be linked to the detailed sensorimotor model. In Section 9
I introduce a computational model of language processing and language acquisi-
tion which draws on these proposals. In Section 10 I consider how the proposals
might extend beyond the example cup-grabbing sentences, and note some areas for
further work.
3 A Syntactic Model of Transitive Cup-Grabbing Sentences
3.1 Choosing a Syntactic Formalism
To begin with, we need a syntactic formalism in which to describe the structure
of the example cup-grabbing sentences. Of course, there are many formalisms to
1 I will briefly discuss ergative languages and passive constructions in Section 10.
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choose from. In the project I am describing, I use an early version of Chomsky’s
Minimalism (Chomsky, 1995b). In fact I will eventually adopt a heavily revised ver-
sion of Minimalism which incorporates ideas from more empiricist syntactic frame-
works, so I encourage non-Minimalist linguists not to stop reading here! However,
I do want to adopt some of the key tenets of a standard Minimalist model. There
are several reasons for this, which I will discuss in turn.
To begin with, Minimalism strongly emphasises simple general-purpose com-
putations in the way advocated by Poeppel and Embick. The Minimalist pro-
gramme aims to reduce to a minimum the amount of theoretical machinery re-
quired to generate the well-formed sentences in a language. Two simple operations,
Merge and Move (or latterly Copy), do much of the work involved in generating
a syntactic structure. I don’t want to claim that Minimalism is the only formal-
ism which adopts a small repertoire of basic computational operations. There are
other formalisms which place an equal emphasis on computation, and posit an
equally minimal repertoire of computations. For instance in categorial grammar,
syntactic derivations are produced (largely) by two operations, ‘functional com-
position’ and ‘type-raising’. And there is interesting research exploring the neu-
ral basis of these operations in non-linguistic domains; see for instance Steedman
(2002). Nonetheless, Minimalism arguably meets Poeppel and Embick’s criteria for
linguistic formalisms: if we find neural mechanisms which plausibly implement
Merge and Copy, we can make a substantive claim about how syntactic analyses
refer to neural mechanisms.
A second reason for adopting Minimalism is that it allows strong claims
about linguistic universals to be made. In Minimalism, there are two levels of syn-
tactic analysis for a sentence: phonetic form (PF) represents its surface word or-
der (among other things), and logical form (LF) represents the structure which the
language processing mechanism delivers to a nonlinguistic semantic/conceptual
system. The surface word order of sentences is obviously very different in differ-
ent languages. One of the interesting claims in Minimalism is that there is a level
of syntactic representation, namely LF, where many of these differences disappear,
and where generalisations across languages are manifest. For instance, while sen-
tences describing the cup-grabbing episode in different languages have very differ-
ent PF structures, the claim in Minimalism is that they have the same structure, or
at least very similar structures, at LF. Among current syntactic theories, this claim
is unique to Minimalism. It is interesting, because it allows for particularly strong
statements about the neural basis of syntactic structures: we can claim that an LF
structure describes some neural process or representation which directly interfaces
with language, and which is the same for all speakers. For instance, consider our
project of studying the relation between syntax and sensorimotor processing in the
cup-grabbing scenario. It is presumably uncontroversial that people the world over
use the same sensorimotor mechanisms to apprehend a cup-grabbing episode re-
gardless of the language they speak. Within Minimalism, we can frame a very
strong hypothesis: that the LF of a cup-grabbing sentence (in any language) di-
rectly describes or recapitulates the sensorimotor processes involved in experienc-
ing the episode it reports. It is only within a framework like Minimalism that we
can express the idea that syntactic representations directly encode sensorimotor
processes. Several theorists developing ‘embodied’ models of language have ar-
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gued that entertaining the meaning of a concrete sentence involves a process of ac-
tive sensorimotor simulation (see e.g. Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2001;
Gre`zes and Decety, 2001; Barsalou et al., 2003; Feldman and Narayanan, 2004). In
this paper I want to provide a syntactic framework for expressing this idea. But
for the moment, my point is just that the Minimalist device of LF allows partic-
ularly strong, optimistic statements connecting syntactic structures and language-
independent neural processes.
Some further reasons for adopting a Minimalist framework relate to the ac-
tual structure of LF as proposed within Minimalist models. I will briefly introduce
this structure in the next section, and then describe why it has some appeal as the
basis for an account of the neural mechanisms underlying syntax.
3.2 The LF Structure of a Transitive Cup-Grabbing Sentence
Minimalist LF representations have a strongly recursive structure. The primitive
structural unit in LF representations is the X-bar schema, which is illustrated in





Figure 1: The X-bar schema
and forms an important part of many non-Chomskyan models of syntax, in par-
ticular HPSG (Pollard and Sag, 1994). The theory was originally introduced as a
refinement of the general hypothesis that syntactic structure is lexical in origin, i.e.
that the lexical items in a sentence contribute or ‘project’ their own elements of lo-
cal syntactic structure. X-bar theory states this idea parsimoniously, positing that
lexical items of all grammatical classes project a phrase with the same basic form,
namely the XP structure shown in Figure 1. XP contains a position for the lexi-
cal item projecting the structure, called the head (X), and also two positions where
semantic material required by the head can appear, the specifier (Spec) and the
complement (Comp). These latter two positions can be recursively filled by other
XPs.
In Chomskyan models, X-bar syntax has been extended in several directions.
In current Minimalism, the X-bar schema is derived from applications of a still more
basic structural operation, Merge, already mentioned in Section 3.1. For most of
this paper I will retain the terminology of X-bar theory, though I will briefly discuss
Merge in Section 10.1. The extension of X-bar theory I will focus on is the notion of
functional projections, that features heavily in early versions of Minimalism, and
is retained in modern Minimalism. Functional projections are XPs headed by non-
lexical elements. In Minimalist analyses, the LF of a clause typically contains many
functional projections as well as regular lexical projections, resulting in structures
containing many more XPs than in other formalisms. These XPs attach to one an-
other predominantly through adjunction to complement positions, creating what
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could be termed ‘right-branching’ LF structures, or more accurately, ‘complement-
branching’ structures (since LF encodes hierarchical semantic structure rather than
left-to-right linear order). These complement-branching structures, in conjunction
with principles allowing movement of syntactic elements from one position to an-
other, support a distinctively Chomskyan style of syntactic model.
The basic LF structure of the transitive sentence The man grabs a cup in the
















Figure 2: Basic LF structure of The man grabs a cup, in the Minimalist model of Chomsky
(1995b). Each XP (including the complement of VP) is shown in a box. Head-raising oper-
ations are shown with solid lines; DP-raising operations are shown with dashed lines.
structure of a clause is strongly complement-branching. I have omitted the internal
structure of noun phrases (which I will call ‘determiner phrases’ or ‘DPs’, following
Abney, 1987), which introduce some measure of left-branching structure when they
appear in specifier positions. But within a DP, Minimalist analyses again envisage
a largely complement-branching structure of XPs (see e.g. Abney, 1987; Zamparelli,
2000; Alexiadou et al., 2007). The idea that the LF structure of clauses and DPs is
predominantly complement-branching is characteristic of Minimalism.
The most distinctive, and controversial, elements in the Minimalist model
of a transitive clause are the functional projections, which are headed by non-
lexical material. In Figure 2 there are two functional projections, AgrSP and AgrOP.
Functional projections were actually introduced in the precursor to Minimalism,
GB (Chomsky, 1981). A novel idea in GB was that XPs can be headed by morpho-
logical inflections as well as by whole words: for instance agreement inflections
on verbs (and later, tense inflections) were assumed to introduce their own XPs,
occupying specific positions in a clause. In Minimalism the idea of functional pro-
jections associated with inflections is retained, though these XPs are now headed by
the semantic features signalled by inflections rather than by inflections themselves.
AgrSP and AgrOP are headed by the main verb’s ‘subject agreement features’ and
‘object agreement features’ respectively (in this case these are both third person sin-
gular). In fact in current Minimalism the LF of a clause standardly includes several
further projections that do not feature in Figure 2, CP, TP, vP and several others:
for most of this paper I will assume the simplified structure in Figure 2, but I will
discuss some of these additional projections in Section 10.2.
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A final adaptation of X-bar theory in Minimalism is that X-bar schemas im-
pose a fixed temporal order on the surface form of sentences: the specifier of an XP
appears to the left of its complement at PF (Kayne, 1994). For this reason I will con-
tinue to use the term ‘right-branching’ to describe the predominant complement-
recursive structure in LF.
The LF structure shown in Figure 2 is generated through a process called
derivation, which involves the step-by-step merging of XPs, interspersed with vari-
ous movement operations, latterly reconstrued as Copy operations.2 The key move-
ment operations are shown in colour in the figure. During derivation, the inflected
verb initially appears at the head of VP, but must raise to the heads of AgrOP and
AgrSP in turn to ‘check’ its inflections. The verb’s arguments (a subject and an ob-
ject) initially appear at the specifier and complement of V, where they are assigned
thematic roles (AGENT and PATIENT), but they must raise to the specifiers of AgrOP
and AgrSP respectively, to be assigned ‘Case’ by the heads of these projections. At
the end of the derivation, we have an LF structure holding multiple copies of the
inflected verb, subject and object at different positions.
For Minimalists, the requirements that inflected verbs ‘check’ their features
at higher heads, and that DPs are assigned ‘Case’ at higher specifier positions, are
simply formal stipulations, which are mainly justified by the roles they play in the
expression of a larger theory of syntax which economically accounts for a sizeable
body of linguistic data. My aim in the current paper is to consider what these
devices might correspond to in a model of neural mechanisms. But I will briefly
outline the theoretical roles they play in the Minimalist model.
The LF structure produced by derivation illustrated in Figure 2 forms the ba-
sis for two accounts. One is an account of syntactic variations between languages—
in particular of differences in the canonical ordering of constituents (e.g. sub-
ject, verb and object). The other is an account of nonlocal syntactic dependencies
within a clause within any given language. The account of cross-linguistic differ-
ences turns on the idea that PF structures are formed by ‘reading out’ LF struc-
tures, with the constraint that only one copy of each moved constituent is pro-
nounced. Differences in canonical constituent order between languages are mod-
elled as differences in the conventions governing this read-out process: thus speak-
ers of English (which has subject-verb-object or SVO order) learn to pronounce the
subject ‘high’, and the verb and object ‘low’, while speakers of Ma¯ori (which has
VSO order) learn to pronounce the verb ‘high’. The Minimalist account of nonlocal
dependencies explains agreement relationships between apparently distant syn-
tactic items by appealing to unpronounced material at LF. For instance, in English,
there is agreement between subjects and verbs, even though subjects appear out-
side the local domain of the verb at PF. In Minimalism agreement is explained by
referring to the structure of LF, in which the verb is present at the head of AgrSP as
well as at the head of VP.
2 I will continue to refer to them as movement operations, though I will certainly adopt the
copy theory of movement.
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3.3 Prospects for a Sensorimotor Interpretation of Minimalist LF Structures
To summarise the previous section: Minimalist LF structures are formed from in-
stances of the X-bar schema (including many functional projections), joined to-
gether into predominantly right-branching structures. They contain two kinds of
nonlocality: one resulting from movement (copying) of DPs to Case-assigning po-
sitions, and one resulting from successive movement (copying) of Vs to feature-
checking positions.
Both these properties of LF structures could potentially have interesting parts
to play in an account of the relation between sensorimotor processing and syntactic
structure. Firstly, LF structures are created from simple building blocks (XPs) com-
bined in a simple general way. There are some sensorimotor models which argue
that sensorimotor processing is likewise decomposed into simple building blocks,
recursively combined to create right-branching structures. I will discuss one of
these in Section 4. If any relationship can be found between the building blocks of
LF and the building blocks of sensorimotor processing, this would be a very inter-
esting discovery. Secondly, there is interesting evidence for multiple occurrences of
certain representations during sensorimotor processing (see Section 6.3 for details).
For instance, in the process of apprehending an episode in which a man grabs a cup,
multiple distinct sensorimotor representations of both the agent (the man) and the
patient (the cup) are activated. Perhaps these provide some basis for the Minimalist
device of movements occurring during derivation of an LF structure. I will pursue
this idea in Section 8.
4 A Proposal about the General Form of Sensorimotor Processing
An interesting proposal about the ‘building blocks’ of sensorimotor processing was
made by Dana Ballard and colleagues (Ballard et al., 1997), in the context of a gen-
eral model of embodied cognition. In this section I will introduce Ballard et al.’s
model.
4.1 Deictic Representations
Ballard et al. argue that at a certain timescale, which they term the ‘embodiment
level’, cognitive processing is intimately connected to sensorimotor routines inter-
facing with the physical world. At this timescale, they suggest, cognitive process-
ing engages in a special way with the moment-to-moment deployment of sensory
and motor apparatus. The illustrations they provide mainly relate to the role of
saccadic eye movements in cognition. Human agents make around 3 saccades per
second throughout their waking lives. Each saccade an agent executes results in a
very transitory fixation on some visual stimulus, and in a similarly transitory pat-
tern of activity in the agent’s visually-derived neural pathways. For instance, the
activity in the ‘ventral’ visual pathway leading to inferotemporal cortex changes
dramatically after every saccade (Freedman et al., 2003); so does at least some of the
activity in the ‘dorsal’ visual pathway through posterior parietal cortex (Colby and
Goldberg, 1999). Ballard et al. call the cognitive representations which reflect the
momentary deployment of an agent’s sensorimotor apparatus deictic representa-
tions.
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Ballard et al. argue that deictic representations play an important role in struc-
turing cognitive processing at the embodiment level. For instance, deictic repre-
sentations reflecting the current position of the eye can help plan the next saccade:
when this is executed, it will generate a new set of deictic representations, so deic-
tic representations and saccades are naturally organised into alternating sequences.
To take another example, deictic representations play an important role in the or-
ganisation of motor actions. When we want to act on a target object, we typically
make a saccade to the object first (Land and Furneaux, 1997; Johansson et al., 2001).
This creates deictic representations of the object in visual cortex and in parietal and
premotor cortex (Geyer et al., 2000, Murata et al., 2000). Representations in the latter
areas encode the object’s motor affordances, and are used to select and eventually
control a motor action (see e.g. Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). Note that motor actions
are not only initiated by deictic representations—they also bring about new deic-
tic representations: for instance, when an agent touches a target object, the tactile
sensors of his hand are ‘momentarily deployed’ to the cup (see e.g. Goodwin and
Wheat, 2004), in much the same way that saccades momentarily deploy the fovea
to a particular point in the visual field.
4.2 Deictic Operations
Ballard et al.’s model is interesting because it identifies commonalities between at-
tentional actions (e.g. saccades) and motor actions (e.g. reach movements). Actions
of both types are modelled as deictic operations: cognitive operations which bring
about updates in the agent’s physical relationship with the environment, and also
in his internal cognitive representations. When talking about deictic operations in
general terms, Ballard et al. make use of a notion of context, which includes infor-
mation about the agent’s cognitive representations at any given time and also about
the physical state of the agent and his environment at that time. To formalise their
definition a little: a deictic operation is executed in an initial context, and results in
the establishment of a new context; it also generates a reafferent sensory signal as
a side-effect. The reafferent signal is a deictic representation which provides sen-
sory feedback that the operation actually occurred. For instance, if the operation
involves attending to a particular object in the environment, the natural reafferent
signal confirming the operation has taken place is a sensory representation of the
object. The general form of a deictic operation is shown in Figure 3.
Initial context Deictic operation Reafferent signal New context
C1 O1 S1 C2
Figure 3: General form of a deictic operation
4.3 Deictic Routines
Ballard et al. propose that cognitive processing at the embodiment level is organ-
ised into sequences of deictic operations called deictic routines. A simple deictic
routine associated with reaching-to-grasp is shown in Figure 4. This particular rou-
tine involves two cycles; each row of the table describes one of these. This example
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Initial context Deictic operation Reafferent signal New context
C1 attend to cup cup C2
C2 grab C3
Figure 4: A simple deictic routine with two cycles
illustrates the recursive nature of deictic routines: the new context created by the
first operation attend to cup (C2) is also the initial context for the second operation
grab.
Note that we need to talk about recursion rather than simple iteration. A
point which Ballard et al. repeatedly stress is that deictic operations and represen-
tations typically cannot be interpreted by themselves: they tend to ‘implicitly refer’
to the operations and representations which preceded them. For instance, the de-
ictic operation grab does not specify a target: the target is specified implicitly by
the deictic representation in place at the time when grab is executed. According to
this model, an agent selects the target of a motor action simply by attending to it,
and then activating the general motor programme ‘grab’. This motor programme
has various free parameters: the location to reach for, the hand shape to form, and
so on. The prior action of attention activates deictic representations in motor path-
ways which fix the values of these parameters. Thinking of the ‘grab’ programme
as a deictic representation accurately reflects the neural mechanisms involved in
actually controlling an action. To take another example, the deictic representation
cup only provides partial information about a cup: it specifies its visual properties,
but not its location in the world, since it is always centred on the retina, at the fovea.
To establish where the fovea is currently directed, we must refer back to the deictic
operation which positioned the fovea, namely attend to cup.
In the general case, to recover the meaning of a deictic representation, we
must make reference not just to the immediately preceding deictic operation, but
to some sequence of preceding deictic operations. For instance, in order to inter-
pret the deictic representations at the end of a grab action, when the agent’s hand is
touching the cup (at contextC3 in Figure 4) we must refer back to the grab operation
which directly led to these sensations, but interpreting the grab operation in turn re-
quires reference back to the preceding attend to cup operation, as discussed above.
The interpretation of deictic operations and representations is right-recursive: it
requires recursive reference to a preceding deictic routine.
In Section 6 I will outline a detailed model of reaching-to-grasp which as-
sumes the framework of deictic routines just sketched. But first I will introduce the
basic proposal I want to make about the relation between syntax and sensorimotor
processing, which is also expressed using the terminology of deictic routines.
5 A Sensorimotor Interpretation of LF Structures and of the X-Bar Schema
As outlined in Section 3, Chomsky’s Minimalist model posits that sentences have
an LF structure as well as a surface phonetic form: LF structure is relatively invari-
ant over translations, and is composed of instances of the X-bar schema, connected
in a largely right-branching way. As outlined in Section 4, Ballard et al. propose that
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sensorimotor processes are organised into deictic routines, which are composed of
deictic operations in a similarly right-branching way. Having introduced a model
of syntax and a model of sensorimotor processing, I will now formulate some pro-
posals which link these two models. Recall that my proposals are only about the
syntax of ‘concrete sentences’, which describe episodes that can be directly appre-
hended through sensorimotor processing.
I will first make a general proposal linking syntactic structures to deictic rou-
tines.
Proposal 1 The LF of a concrete sentence reporting an episode E pro-
vides a description of the deictic routine through which E is experi-
enced.
One way of thinking about Propoal 1 is as an expression of the kind of simulation-
ist account of sentence meaning advocated by theorists like Gallese and Goldman
(1998) and Feldman and Narayanan (2004). In Minimalism, the LF of a sentence
represents its meaning—or at least, as much of its meaning as can be encoded syn-
tactically. The novel thing about the proposal is that it expresses a simulationist
account of meaning in a way which links recursively structured syntactic represen-
tations to recursively structured sensorimotor routines. This opens the way for a
much stronger statement of the proposal, which links the basic building blocks of
LF structures to the basic building blocks of sensorimotor routines. Ultimately, what
I want to propose is a general sensorimotor characterisation of the X-bar schema
from which LF structures are formed, as follows:
Proposal 2 Each X-bar schema in the LF of a concrete sentence de-
scribes a single cycle in the deictic routine described by the LF struc-
ture.
More specifically, I want to suggest that each constituent within the X-bar schema
has a well-defined sensorimotor interpretation.
Proposal 3 The components of an X-bar schema describe a cycle of a
deictic routine, as follows:
• the maximal projection (XP) describes the initial context in which
a deictic operation occurs;
• the head (X) describes the operation itself;
• the specifier describes the reafferent signal of the operation;
• the complement describes the new context which the operation









Proposal 2 and its extension Proposal 3 express very strong claims, as they
link the basic structural element from which syntactic structures are formed to the
basic element from which sensorimotor processes are formed. (Recall we are still
restricting our attention to concrete sentences.) One of the attractive aspects of
Minimalism is that it envisages simple building blocks for syntactic structures. One
of the attractions of Ballard et al.’s model is that it envisages simple building blocks
for sensorimotor process (at least at the embodiment timescale). I want to suggest
that there is a relationship between the building blocks in each domain.
An important idea implicit in the above proposals is that the right-branching
organisation of LF structures mirrors the right-branching structure of deictic rou-
tines. A corollary of Proposal 3 is that a right-branching structure of XPs describes
a sequence of deictic operations, i.e. a deictic routine. This is illustrated in Figure 5,











Figure 5: Sensorimotor interpretation of a right-branching structure of two X-bar schemas
red labels show some of the sensorimotor interpretations which are sanctioned by
Proposal 3. XP describes the initial context (C1) for some deictic operation (O1).
The complement of XP describes the new context (C2) brought about by this op-
eration. Since YP appears at this position, it also describes C2, which is therefore
also the initial context for a second deictic operation (O2), bringing about a third
context (C3). Thus by Proposal 3, a right-branching strucure of X-bar schemas de-
scribes a deictic routine. (Note that if LF structures are in general right-branching,
Proposal 1, that LF structures describe deictic routines, is also a corollary of Proposal 3.)
Because Proposal 3 is expressed in terms of the building blocks of LF struc-
tures, it makes very strong and specific predictions about the relationship between
syntax and sensorimotor processing for any concrete sentence. The proposal pre-
dicts that we can take any sentence describing a concrete episode, and find a map-
ping of the right kind between the LF of this sentence and the structure of the sen-
sorimotor processing through which the described episode is apprehended. Given
that the accounts of LF structure and of sensorimotor processing are derived from
completely separate data (well-formedness judgements vs data about neural pro-
cesses), using completely different methodologies (syntactic argumentation vs ex-
perimental neuroscience), finding a mapping of the predicted kind would provide
good empirical support for the generalisation expressed in Proposal 3.
Of course, there is more to LF than the right-branching structure illustrated
in Figure 5. As already discussed in Section 3.2, the LF of a transitive sentence is
regularly right-branching, but also contains various types of re-entrancy, reflecting
movement operations: DP raising to Case-assigning positions and head-raising for
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semantic feature checking (see the illustration in Figure 2). If the LF structure of
a concrete sentence really does describe sensorimotor processing, we should make
several further predictions, namely that these movement operations can also be
given sensible sensorimtotor interpretations. In the next three sections I will ex-
amine these predictions. In Sections 6 and 7 I will introduce a model of the sen-
sorimotor processing required to apprehend a cup-grabbing episode and to store
it in working memory. In Section 8 I will examine the relationship between this
model and the LF model introduced in Section 3.2, considering both the overall
right-branching structure of LF and the re-entrant structures associated with DP
movement and head raising.
6 Sensorimotor Processing Involved inApprehending a Cup-Grabbing Episode
In this section I will argue that the sensorimotor processing through which a cup-
grabbing episode is apprehended takes the form of a deictic routine with three cy-
cles, with the structure shown in Figure 6. The argument is given in much more
detail in Knott (2012); I will just summarise it here.
Initial context Deictic operation Reafferent signal New context
C1 attend man man C2
C2 attend cup cup C3
C3 grab man C4 / cup
Figure 6: Deictic routine involved in experiencing a cup-grabbing episode
6.1 Cycle 1: Attention to the Agent
The deictic routine shown in Figure 6 is somewhat more complex than the short
routine used for illustrative purposes in Section 4.3. The main reason for this is
that it provides an account of the apprehension of a whole episode, rather than just
of the execution of a motor action. A cup-grabbing episode has an agent, as well
as a motor action and a target. I will begin by arguing that whenever an observer
apprehends an episode involving an agent through sensorimotor means, the agent
must be attended to first.
As a starting point, note that the agent of the grab action—the man—could
be someone external to the observer, but could also be the observer himself. In
a sentence reporting the observed episode, this difference is reflected in the sen-
tence’s subject, and in the verb’s subject agreement features (I grab vs He grabs).
Interestingly, apart from these differences, the LF of the sentence is the same in
these two scenarios. Proposals 1–3 make a strong prediction from this observa-
tion: that the sensorimotor processes through which an agent apprehends his own
actions are largely the same as those through which he apprehends the actions of
others.
There is certainly support for this general idea in neuroscience: it forms the
basis for the well-known ‘mirror system hypothesis’ (see e.g. Gallese et al., 1996).
The hypothesis originated with the discovery of neurons in area F5 of the premotor
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cortex of macaque monkeys which respond to specific grasp movements whether
they are initiated by the monkey itself or by an observed third party (di Pellegrino
et al., 1992). It has since been corroborated in many other studies finding common
representations for observed and executed actions (see Fadiga et al., 2005 for a sum-
mary). The hypothesis has been put to work in several ways in neural models of
language, in particular in accounts of language evolution trading on the sugges-
tion that area F5 is the macaque homologue of Broca’s area (see e.g. Rizzolatti and
Arbib, 1998; Arbib, 2005). But the main use I want to make of the hypothesis is in
an account of the very first sensorimotor operation an observer must perform when
apprehending an episode.
If we accept that agents use assemblies in premotor cortex to represent the ac-
tions of others as well as their own actions, this raises the question of how an agent
is able to distinguish between his own actions and those of other people. There
are several models of how this distinction is made. My model derives mainly from
accounts by Haggard (2008) and Farrer and Frith (2002). The basic idea is that
the neural circuitry activating action representations in premotor cortex must be
configured for either action execution or action observation before representations
in this area can be interpreted. There is good general evidence that the brain can
switch between alternative general modes of connectivity, implemented by distinct
large-scale neural networks (see e.g. Bressler and Menon, 2010). I argue that action
execution and action observation require the establishment of different modes of
connectivity within the mirror system. In ‘execution mode’, premotor representa-
tions are activated through a well-studied sensorimotor pathway which maps vi-
sual representations onto motor affordances (as discussed in Section 4), and in turn
they generate overt motor actions. In ‘perception mode’, premotor representations
are activated through a completely different neural pathway through the superior
temporal sulcus, specialised for analysing biological movements (see e.g. Jellema et
al., 2000), and a mechanism is in place to prevent these premotor representations re-
sulting in overt actions, so that the observer does not reflexively imitate the actions
he sees.
The above account can be neatly expressed using the terminology of deictic
routines. Action representations in premotor cortex are a variety of deictic repre-
sentation: they cannot be interpreted in isolation, because in isolation we do not
know whether to attribute them to ourselves or to some external agent. In order
to interpret them, we must make reference to a prior mode-setting operation. The
mode-setting operation can therefore be modelled as a deictic operation.
It is also useful to think of the deictic operation establishing action execu-
tion or action perception mode as an action of attention, to the agent of the action
which will presently be represented in premotor cortex. The operation establishing
execution mode is like an action of attention to onesself, since it is this operation
which allows an agent to attribute the action subsequently evoked in premotor cor-
tex to himself. There is good evidence that part of an agent’s ‘concept of self’ is
implemented in the neural mechanisms which initiate volitional actions; see e.g.
Haggard, 2008; Chambon et al., 2012. And there are good grounds for allowing
for the possibility of actions of attention to onesself; see e.g. Damasio, 1999 and
Critchley et al. (2003) for accounts of a ‘pre-attentional’ representation of the self
from which higher-level representations of self can be selectively activated. The
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operation establishing perception mode is also plausibly attentional in origin. In
the most obvious scenario it is triggered by attention to an external agent in the
world, who presents a salient enough stimulus to the observing agent to cause him
to engage his action perception circuitry. In this case, the deictic operation required
to interpret activity in premotor cortex involves a regular action of visual atten-
tion as well as a mode-setting operation. The reafferent side-effect of this attentional
action is a representation of the particular external agent who is attended to.
To summarise: when an observer apprehends an episode in which an agent
executes an action, he must attend to the agent (generating a representation of the
agent as a reafferent side-effect) before activating a representation of the action in
premotor cortex. The agent attended to could be the observer himself or it could be
an external agent, but in either case we can speak of an action of attention to this
agent, resulting in activation of a representation of this agent.
6.2 Cycle 2: Attention to the Target
If the observed action involves reaching for a target object, the observer must also
attend to this object before activating a representation of the action. As already
noted in Section 4, an agent executing a reach action typically fixates the target ob-
ject very early in the reach, probably before a detailed grasp motor programme has
been activated (Land and Furneaux, 1997; Johansson et al., 2001). So if the observer
of the action is the agent, there is quite good evidence that the target must be at-
tended to before a motor programme is activated. Interestingly if the observer is
watching an external agent perform a grasp action, there is also evidence that atten-
tion to the target precedes activation of a motor representation. Observers watching
an external agent reach for a target typically saccade to the target well before the
agent’s hand reaches it (Flanagan and Johansson, 2003; Webb et al., 2010). They are
able to infer the observed agent’s intention, and then put themselves into the same
attentional state as the agent while the action is still under way. This establishment
of joint attention plays a crucial role in computational models of learning in the
mirror system, because it allows agents to use visual representations of their own
actions to learn how to recognise the actions of external agents (see e.g. Oztop and
Arbib, 2002; Oztop et al., 2005).
To summarise: in a deictic model of the perception of a reach-to-grasp action,
two deictic operations must occur before the grasp action itself can be activated.
First, the agent of the action must be attended to. This operation is either an action
of attention to onesself, if one is executing the action, or an action of attention to an
external agent. Second, the target of the action must be attended to. If one is exe-
cuting the action, this operation is needed to fix the parameters of the motor action
to be executed. If one is watching an external action, the operation is executed in
order to establish the same attentional state as the observed agent. In either case, it
is only once the agent and patient have both been attended to that a single motor
programme can be selected.
6.3 Cycle 3: Action Monitoring and Completion
When the observer attends to the intended target object, a set of alternative motor
programmes is activated in premotor cortex (the object’s ‘motor affordances’) and
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these compete amongst one another until a winning programme is selected, either
as the programme to be executed (see e.g. Fagg and Arbib, 1998) or as the winning
hypothesis about the type of action being performed (Oztop and Arbib, 2002).
Once a motor programme has been selected in this fashion, the character of
sensorimotor processing changes. In the case of action execution, a physical ac-
tion is initiated, which is shaped in real time by the representations currently ac-
tive in the agent’s sensorimotor pathways (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). The agent’s
neural pathways, motor effectors and physical environment together implement a
dynamical system, which (if all goes well) moves towards an attractor state where
the agent is holding the target. In the case of action perception, processing also has
the character of a dynamical system, this time a simulated one (see again Oztop
and Arbib, 2002; Oztop et al., 2005).
Again it is useful to cast this processing within the framework of deictic rou-
tines. Activating the ‘grab’ representation in premotor cortex is an operation which
initiates a dynamical system. This operation has its own reafferent sensory conse-
quences, and also eventually results in a new context in which new deictic opera-
tions are possible. I will consider these two aspects of the operation in turn.
What is the reafferent sensory signal associated with the execution of or ob-
servation of an action? When we are in the process of executing an action, we are
aware of our body moving: there is a characteristic ‘match’ betwen the pattern of
outgoing motor signals and the pattern of incoming sensory signals, because the
sensory signals are produced by our motor movements. This match signal appears
to be involved in producing the sense of agency that we feel when we perform an
action, through which we are able to attribute the action to ourselves (Farrer and
Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008). Of course, our conception of self is highly mul-
timodal. Different elements of this construct are activated at different stages of
action execution. We have already seen that one component of an agent’s concep-
tion of self is activated at an early stage during action preparation (Haggard, 2008,
Chambon et al., 2012). Another component is activated when an action as actually
under way (Farrer et al., 2008). (Chambon et al. refer to these two conceptions as
‘propsective’ and ‘retrospective’ concepts of self.) The circuits which control action
execution must include some mechanism for binding together these different facets
of our concept of self.
A very similar point can be made about action perception. As argued in
Section 6.1, an observer initially attends to an external agent as a salient object in
the world. But when the observer begins to monitor that agent’s actions, the agent
is represented differently, as a characteristic pattern of movement, rather than as a
static object. (See Ramsey and Hamilton, 2010 for evidence that action observation
involves dissociable representations of the observed agent as a token individual
and as an animate entity.) Again, our conception of an observed agent is a multi-
modal construct, and different facets of the construct seem to be accessed at differ-
ent points during action perception: the action perception mechanism must include
a mechanism which integrates these different representations of observed agents.
In sum, I argue that an observer attends to the agent at two distinct points in
the course of apprehending a reach-to-grasp action— once at the very start, when
action perception or action execution mode is established, and once during the
process of actively monitoring the action to completion—and that there must be a
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mechanism for binding together the different representations of the agent obtained
through these two different actions of attention.
I now consider the new context brought about by the grasp motor action:
namely the state in which the agent is holding the target object. As already noted
in Section 4, this state is well modelled within the framework of deictic routines,
because it has both physical and attentional components. Successfully executing a
grasp action achieves a substantive physical change in the world: the agent’s hand
moves to achieve stable contact with the target. But it also deploys the agent’s tac-
tile senses to the target object, providing him with information about the target in
a new modality. Just as there are two actions of attention to the agent in the course
of apprehending a reach-to-grasp action, there are quite clearly two actions of at-
tention to the target, again in different modalities, and again occurring at different
times. The target is first attended to in the visual modality, as part of the process of
preparing the grasp action, and it is later attended to in the haptic modality, when
the action is complete. Again, the structure of the sensorimotor routine plays a crit-
ical in the formation of a cross-modal representations of the target object. At the
point when a stable grasp is achieved on the object, the visual representation of the
object axiomatically corresponds to one of its motor affordances (see e.g. Oztop et
al., 2004).
At this point, I have motivated the arguments for the deictic routine illus-
trated in Figure 6. In the initial context C1, the observer attends to the agent (who is
himself or an external agent), and as a reafferent consequence receives a represen-
tation of the agent (man) and establishes a new context C2. In this context, objects
in the agent’s perispace compete for attention, and the observer attends to a cup,
activating a representation of the cup as a reafferent consequence, and establishes a
third contextC3. In this context, the agent activates the motor programme grab, and
an action is dynamically monitored. While the motor programme is under way, a
dynamic representation of the agent is activated as a reafferent consequence, and
when the action is complete, we enter a final context C4, in which a haptic repre-
sentation of the cup is active.
A final thought: it might perhaps be thought that modelling the experience
of a reach-to-grasp action as a deictic routine as illustrated in Figure 6 somehow
understates the complexity of the action-monitoring process, which is construed
as a single stage in the routine, with the same basic form as a simple attentional
action. I certainly acknowledge that action monitoring, whether it involves execu-
tion or perception of an ongoing action, has greater complexity than an attentional
action. Monitoring a reach-to-grasp action takes far longer than attending to an
object, and it is well known that the process involves two largely separate neural
pathways, one for reaching and one for grasping: see classically Jeannerod (1996)
(and for a review see Knott, 2012). But my suggestion is that this type of composi-
tional structure is not visible to language. My proposal is that the syntax of language
engages with the discrete, temporal structure of a sensorimotor routine. And at this
level, the process of monitoring an action may in fact be quite simple. A motor
programme controlling the dynamics of the combined hand/arm system (whether
actual or simulated) can bring about complex changes in this system without hav-
ing complex dynamics itself; this is an important fact about dynamical systems. If
language interfaces with representations that control the dynamics of movements,
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rather than with dynamical movements themselves, the additional complexity of
action monitoring may not be visible in the sensorimotor signals that interface with
language.
7 Working Memory Representations of Sensorimotor Routines
One outstanding question from Section 5 concerns what’s meant by the assertion
that an LF representation ‘describes’ a sensorimotor routine. Clearly I do not want
to propose that sentences directly report sensorimotor processes, as these arise in
real time. We can execute sensorimotor routines without engaging language, and
we can produce concrete sentences which are unrelated to our current sensorimotor
environment. The standard assumption in psycholinguistics is that sentences pro-
duced by a speaker reflect representations of events and states, held in that speaker’s
working memory (Levelt, 1989). I certainly want to adhere to that idea. I there-
fore need to provide an account of how the cup-grabbing episode is represented in
working memory. Ideally, this should be framed within a more general account of
episode representations in working memory. Ultimately, I need to re-express the
proposals about LF made in Section 5 in a way which connects to an account of
working memory episode representations.
In Sections 7.1 and 7.2 I make a suggestion about how concrete episodes are
stored in working memory. In Sections 7.3 and 7.4 I discuss how this mechanism
interfaces with language, and in the light of this, give a more precise interpretation
of LF.
7.1 A Model of Episode Representations in Working Memory
My account of working memory is based on Alan Baddeley’s recent model of work-
ing memory for episodes (Baddeley, 2000). Baddeley suggests that there is a work-
ing memory medium called the episodic buffer, which holds semantic representa-
tions of episodes, and which interfaces with the well-known phonological buffer
(Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) in a way which supports language processing.
Baddeley’s main argument for the episodic buffer hinges on the fact that ex-
periencing a concrete episode often takes a significant amount of time. (Apprehen-
ding an episode involves monitoring it as it occurs; this may take several seconds,
often longer.) In order to store the episode in long-term memory, it must be encoded
in the hippocampus, as a preliminary to being consolidated in cortical long-term
memory (McClelland et al., 1995). But storing associations between representations
in the hippocampus can only be achieved through the mechanism of long-term
potentiation (LTP), which requires them to be active within about 100ms of each
other (Abraham et al., 2002). Baddeley concludes that experienced episodes must
be buffered in a working memory medium, and then replayed to the hippocampus
at a speed which allows them to be associated through LTP. Additional evidence
for the existence of short-term memory representations of observed episodes is re-
viewed in Swallow et al. (2009).
Baddeley does not speculate much about the format in which episodes are
encoded in the episodic buffer, beyond requiring that it supports them being trans-
mitted to the hippocampus. There are many models of how episodes are stored in
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working memory (see e.g. Shastri, 2001, 2002; Chang et al., 2002; Plate, 2003; van
der Velde and de Kamps, 2006). I make a new suggestion, which is based on the
assumption that concrete episodes are experienced as deictic routines. My sugges-
tion is that a concrete episode like the cup-grabbing episode is stored in the episodic
buffer as a planned sequence of sensorimotor operations, i.e. a planned deictic routine
(see Takac and Knott, 2013 for an implemented model). This view of working mem-
ory episode representations is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it offers a new
solution to the question of how thematic roles are bound to participants in episode
representations. Any neural model of episode representation must have a way of
identifying the roles played by the different participants in an action (in our case,
agent and patient). The deictic routine through which an episode is experienced
distinguishes these roles clearly, because they are associated with different serial
positions in the routine. Secondly, the neural mechanisms which support the prepa-
ration of sensorimotor sequences have been intensively studied, and we know quite
a lot about them. If these prepared sequences are examples in a ‘concrete’ domain
of working memory episode representations, then studying their properties may
help us formulate a more general model of these representations which extends
beyond concrete episodes. Thirdly, viewing working memory episode representa-
tions as prepared sequences fits well with their role in Baddeley’s model of replay
to the hippocampus. The hippocampus is often seen as specialised for storing se-
quentially structured information (Wallenstein, 1998; Eichenbaum et al., 2004), and
is known to support fast replay of sequences (see e.g. Foster and Wilson, 2006;
Diba and Buzsa´ki, 2007). If working memory episode representations are prepared
sensorimotor sequences, they can be communicated to the hippocampus by being
replayed, in simulation, at high speed, in a mode where each of them activates an
assembly in the hippocampus. Finally, thinking of working memory episode rep-
resentations as supporting simulation accords well with the simulationist accounts
of propositional meaning already mentioned (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Feldman
and Narayanan, 2004 and others).
In the remainder of this section I will refine my sensorimotor interpretation of
LF in a way which makes reference to the model of working memory for episodes
just outlined. The basic idea will be that an LF representation describes a deictic
routine as it is replayed from episodic working memory, rather than as it occurs in real
time. In Section 7.2 I discuss the mechanics of the working memory replay oper-
ation, and make a suggestion about the pattern of sensorimotor signals activated
during a replayed sensorimotor routine. In Sections 7.3 and 7.4 I discuss the lin-
guistic reflexes of these signals, and give a more precise sensorimotor definition of
LF which makes reference to these.
7.2 Sensorimotor Signals Active During a Replayed Sensorimotor Routine
As just mentioned, we know a lot about the neural mechanisms which store pre-
pared sequences of sensorimotor operations in working memory. These mecha-
nisms are mainly in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (see e.g. Barone and Joseph, 1989;
Averbeck et al., 2002; Averbeck and Lee, 2007) and the supplementary motor areas
(Shima and Tanji, 2000).
One interesting property of prefrontal sequence representations is that while
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they support the execution of sensorimotor operations in sequence, they actually
identify the different prepared operations individually, and in parallel. For instance,
within the prefrontal representation encoding the cup-grabbing routine, it is pos-
sible to identify assemblies encoding each of the three prepared operations, at-
tend man, attend cup and grab (see especially Averbeck et al., 2002). I will make this
explicit by designating the prefrontal sequence plan planattend man/attend cup/grab.
There is also evidence that planning representations remain tonically active
while the planned sequence is being executed (see Averbeck and Lee, 2007; also the
computational models of Rhodes et al., 2004 and Takac and Knott, 2013). When a
cup-grabbing episode is replayed from working memory, we therefore generate a
mixture of sustained and transient signals to be activated, as shown in Figure 7.
The sustained signals are all active in prefrontal areas; the transient ones occur in
Sustained signals Transient signals
Initial Deictic Reafferent New
context operation signal context
planattend man/attend cup/grab c1 attend man man c2
planattend man/attend cup/grab c2 attend cup cup c3
planattend man/attend cup/grab c3 grab man c4 / cup
Figure 7: The time course of signals occurring during the replay of the cup-grabbing
episode in working memory
the sensorimotor areas which are active during actual sensorimotor experience, in
accordance with simulationist models.
Another important property of the prefrontal sequence-planning mechanism
is that it makes use of a representation of ‘the current context’ which is updated af-
ter each operation. Executing a planned sequence of operations relies on tonically
active representations of the planned operations, but also on a dynamically chang-
ing representation of context. There are several different models of these context
representations (see e.g. Dominey et al., 1995; Houghton and Hartley, 1995; Beiser
and Houk, 1998; Takac and Knott, 2013). I will remain neutral about their exact
nature; in Figure 7 I just refer to them as c1–c4.3
7.3 The Interface Between Replayed Sensorimotor Sequences and Language
In Section 7.1 I proposed that an LF representation describes a sensorimotor routine
as it is replayed from working memory. Before I consider how this proposal applies
to the cup-grabbing sentence, I want to state it as concretely as possible, by provid-
ing an explicit proposal about how sensorimotor signals interface with linguistic
representations at the level of neural circuits.
3 Note that in earlier examples of deictic routines I used capitals to denote contexts (C1. . .Cn).
These were understood as denoting contexts as represented by a theorist watching an agent:
they combine objective information about the agent’s current physical state with information
about his current sensorimotor representations. ‘Subjective’ contexts (c1. . . cn) are basically
an agent’s internal representations of objective contexts. In an account of how sensorimotor
signals interface with language, we can only make reference to subjective contexts.
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I first assume that there is an area of the human brain which encodes motor
plans associated with linguistic actions (e.g. planned articulatory actions), which I
will call the premotor output area. This roughly corresponds to what others have
called the ‘phonological output buffer’, and have localised in parts of Broca’s area
and adjacent areas of prefrontal and articulatory premotor cortex (see e.g. Henson
et al., 2000; Sahin et al., 2009).
I further assume that the human brain contains a number of neural circuits
specialised for concrete language which I will call interface circuits, each of which
links an area expressing sensorimotor signals to the premotor output area, so that
activating sensorimotor signals in these areas can activate arbitrary motor plans
(in particular articulatory plans). These circuits can hold learned associations be-
tween individual sensorimotor concepts and individual motor movements: they
allow the production of atomic symbolic gestures, of the kind posited in Bickerton’s
(1995) account of ‘protolanguage’. There may be several interface circuits, linking
different classes of sensorimotor signal to the premotor output medium. I assume
each of these circuits evolved separately, through an adaptive mutation allowing
a particular class of sensorimotor concepts to be associated with overt expressive
behaviours.
Now consider what happens when a sensorimotor routine stored in episodic
working memory is replayed, and we generate a pattern of sensorimotor signals
like the one shown in Figure 7. This will produce a pattern of signals in the pre-
motor output area. Importantly, this pattern of output signals need not reflect the
pattern of sensorimotor signals in every detail. There may not be an interface circuit
for every sensorimotor area. And different circuits may express sensorimotor sig-
nals at different levels of detail. Thus when a prepared deictic routine is replayed,
the pattern of signals evoked in the premotor output area will reflect the pattern
evoked in sensorimotor areas, as filtered by the interface circuits. With this idea in
mind, I will state more precisely how I suggest we can interpret the LF of a concrete
sentence.
Proposal 4 The LF of a concrete sentence reporting an episode E pro-
vides a description of the pattern of signals activated when the deic-
tic routine through which E is experienced is replayed from episodic
working memory, including signals activated in the premotor output
area.
7.4 The Replay Mechanism as the Basis for an Account of Head Raising
Proposal 4 suggests that LF reflects the structure of replayed sensorimotor routines,
but also the properties of the interface circuits linking sensorimotor areas to the
linguistic output medium. A key question now is: what are these interface circuits,
and what are their properties?
As already mentioned, not all sensorimotor areas participating in a replayed
deictic routine need have interfaces to linguistic outputs. Informationally speaking,
there is a lot of redundancy in the pattern of signals active in a replayed deictic rou-
tine. During replay, each deictic operation is expressed in two different media, one
encoding the operation as it is planned, the other encoding it as it is experienced (or
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rather, simulated). For instance, in the pattern shown in Figure 7 there is a repre-
sentation of the motor operation grab in the planning medium (where it is tonically
active), and another in the ‘deictic operation’ medium (where it is transiently active
in Cycle 3). Likewise there are multiple representations of man and cup: these fea-
ture both as actions of attention and as transient reafferent object representations.
The presence of sustained representations of deictic operations in the pattern
of activity created by a replayed deictic routine prompts an interesting suggestion
about the neural mechanisms underlying the Minimalist account of head raising.
Recall from Section 3.2 that an inflected verb generated at the head of VP must raise
to the head of AgrOP and then the head of AgrSP, to check its ‘agreement features’.
AgrSP and AgrOP are headed by bundles of subject and object agreement features
respectively, while VP is headed by the verb. But the verb is allowed to appear at
higher head positions, and its agreement features are allowed to appear at lower
head positions. The Minimalist account of head-raising allows, indeed requires,
heads to appear ‘out of position’: it is through this device that a Minimalist analysis
explains the extended syntactic domain of the verb and its agreement features.
If, as I am suggesting, a right-branching LF structure describes a temporal se-
quence of deictic operations, and if the head of each XP in an LF structure signals a
deictic operation (see Proposal 3), then the principles which sanction head-raising
must be interpreted as allowing heads to describe deictic operations out of sequence.
They allow the head of an XP to report not just the deictic operation presently oc-
curring, but all deictic operations in the deictic routine currently being rehearsed,
including those which have already occurred and those which have yet to occur. A
natural way of explaining this is to suggest that the linguistic signals of deictic op-
erations come from the area where they are planned, and are therefore tonically ac-
tive in parallel during replay, rather than from the areas where they are transiently
expressed one by one. I will suggest a further elaboration of the ‘sensorimotor’
interpretation of an XP to this effect:
Proposal 5 The head (X) of an XP in the LF structure of a concrete sen-
tence describes a deictic operation in a replayed deictic routine as it is
represented in the prefrontal area storing the deictic routine.
Given that the prefrontal area holding prepared deictic routines represents their
component deictic operations tonically, and in parallel, it follows from Proposal 5
that all the heads in a right-branching structure of XPs describe the same set of
deictic operations.
To summarise: the suggestion made in Section 7.3, that an LF structure de-
scribes a replayed sequence of deictic operations (Proposal 4), recommends itself not
only as a way of incorporating reference to working memory representations in a
sensorimotor characterisation of LF. It also opens the way for a promising account
of the neural basis of head-raising, which is grounded in known facts about the
representation of prepared sequences in prefrontal cortex. If LF describes a tem-
poral sequence of operations, then the Minimalist device of head-raising within LF
can be understood as a way of encoding the presence of tonically active representa-
tions within the neural areas from which surface language forms can be produced.
And we know that there are such representations when a prepared sensorimotor
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sequence is replayed.
Independently of these considerations, there is also good evidence that the
processing of verbs and their inflections (the elements involved in head-raising)
does indeed involve the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Left dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex is an area associated with the production and interpretation of verbs (see
Perani et al., 1999; Tranel et al., 2001; Pulvermu¨ller et al., 1999) and the processing of
verb inflections (see Shapiro and Caramazza, 2003; Shapiro et al., 2012).
8 A Sensorimotor Interpretation of the LF of the Cup-Grabbing Sentence
We can now consider how the general proposals just made about the LF struc-
ture of concrete sentences apply to our particular cup-grabbing scenario. We have
a Minimalist model of the LF of a transitive sentence reporting a cup-grabbing
episode (see Figure 2). And we have a model of the pattern of neural signals ac-
tivated when the deictic routine through which a cup-grabbing episode is experi-
enced is replayed from episodic working memory (see Figure 7). Proposal 4 asserts
that the LF of the cup-grabbing sentence can be construed as a description of the
pattern of signals activated during replay—i.e. that the LF structure in Figure 2 can
be thought of as a description of the pattern shown in Figure 7. Proposal 2 asserts
that in addition, each X-bar schema in the LF structure describes one cycle of the
replayed deictic routine. And Proposal 3, extended by Proposal 5, suggests roles
for each constituent in each X-bar schema. In this section I will examine these as-
sertions, and in the process make some further general suggestions about how to
interpret the Minimalist account of LF in sensorimotor terms.
8.1 General Alignment of the LF Structure and the Deictic Routine
At the level of X-bar schemas, the LF of a transitive cup-grabbing sentence aligns
well with the deictic routine it is supposed to represent. The LF structure contains
three XPs, and the deictic routine contains three cycles. We can therefore interpret
each XP as describing a single cycle of the deictic routine. The predicted sensori-
motor interpretations are shown in Figure 8. AgrSP describes Cycle 1 of the routine
(an action of attention to the agent), AgrOP describes Cycle 2 (an action of attention
to the patient), and VP describes Cycle 3 (execution/monitoring of the ‘grab’ mo-
tor programme). According to Proposal 3, each X-bar schema describes a context-
update operation: XP describes the context in which a deictic operation is executed
and its complement describes the new context which it brings about. This allows us
to interpret the right-branching chain of XPs (AgrSP, AgrOP, VP, DP) as describing
the four contexts c1–c4 in the deictic routine. The general form of the LF structure
certainly corresponds well to the general form of the deictic routine.
In Sections 8.2 and 8.3 I will consider the interpretation of specific elements
within the LF structure.
8.2 Sensorimotor Interpretations of Argument Positions
I will first consider the sensorimotor interpretations of the positions in the LF struc-






























Figure 8: Sensorimotor interpretation of the LF structure of The man grabs a cup.
Sensorimotor interpretations are shown in red.
The subject man appears at the specifier of AgrSP and the specifier of VP. The object
cup appears at the specifier of AgrOP and the complement of VP.
If we assume the alignment of X-bar schemas and deictic routine cycles shown
in Figure 8, and the sensorimotor interpretations of specifier and complement po-
sitions made in Proposal 3, these positions correspond exactly to the positions in
the deictic routine where representations of man and cup are active. The speci-
fier of AgrSP is predicted to describe the reafferent sensorimotor signal man—and
the word man appears at this position. The specifier of AgrOP is predicted to de-
scribe the reafferent sensorimotor signal cup—and the word cup appears at this
position. The specifier of VP is predicted to describe the second activation of the
signal man, this time as a reafferent signal generated during monitoring of the mo-
tor programme—this is the other position where the word man appears. So far so
good.
The remaining position, the complement of VP is predicted to describe the
consequent state of the action, in which the agent is holding the cup. This is the
other position where the word cup appears. This position is interesting syntacti-
cally, because it is the only place where an argument appears as a complement,
rather than as a specifier. Within the sensorimotor model, we can make two predic-
tions about it. On one hand, since the word cup occupies this position, we predict
it will describe the reafferent signal cup. But equally, since it is a complement posi-
tion, we predict it to describe the consequent state of the action taking place in the
third cycle of the deictic routine, namely the grab action.
As discussed in Section 6.3, the consequent state of the grab action does in-
deed have a special dual status. This action is a substantive motor action, bringing
about a change in the world. But it is also an attentional action, providing infor-
mation about the cup in the modality of touch. The stable grasp state is axiomat-
ically a state in which the cup representation is active, because it is at this point
that the function mapping visual object representations onto goal motor states is
trained. The dual status of the VP complement as an argument position and a com-
plement position perfectly reflects this built-in identification of the target represen-
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tation with the goal motor state.
In summary, the sensorimotor interpretations predicted for all four argument
positions by Proposal 3 are quite plausible. In fact one might well go further, and
suggest they may provide helpful insights into the Minimalist concepts of ‘speci-
fier’ and ‘complement’. Recall that the aim of the paper is to seek a linking theory
connecting syntactic constructs to neural mechanisms. Without such a theory, syn-
tactic constructs like ‘specifier’ and ‘complement’ are justified purely through the
roles they play in a larger theory of syntax. Sensorimotor characterisations of these
terms provide a way of thinking about them empirically which is entirely indepen-
dent from the role they play in syntax. If the independent conceptions of ‘specifier’
and ‘complement’ line up with the conceptions motivated from syntactic theory, as
they seem to in the cup-grabbing example, this has the character of an empirical
result: it suggests that the empirical conceptions may be the basis for the theoreti-
cal conceptions, explaining why these conceptions play a useful role in a theory of
syntax.
8.3 Sensorimotor Interpretations of Head Positions: V, AgrS and AgrO
I will next consider the sensorimotor interpretations of head positions which are
predicted by Proposal 3. Proposal 3 asserts that the head of an XP denotes a deictic
operation: thus the items appearing at V, AgrS and AgrO are predicted to describe
the three deictic operations in the deictic routine through which the cup-grabbing
episode is apprehended.
The case of V is quite straightforward: the word which appears at this posi-
tion (grabs) is easily thought of as describing the third operation in the deictic rou-
tine, activation of the grab motor programme. The more interesting cases are AgrS
and AgrO. In Minimalism, these heads hold the ‘agreement features’ of the sub-
ject and object respectively. Agreement features classify the subject and object into
broad semantic categories along various dimensions, principally PERSON, NUMBER
and GENDER, though exactly how categories are defined within these dimensions
varies from language to language. The sensorimotor interpretation of LF sees these
bundles of agreement features (e.g. 3RD PERSON SINGULAR, MASCULINE) as ‘de-
scriptions of attentional operations’. Does this proposal make sense?
To begin with, it should be noted that Agr projections as originally proposed
in Minimalism were seen as carrying features with no real semantic content; Agr
features were traditionally checked and then erased, so they were not visible in the LF
structure presented to the semantic system. In my interpretation, Agr heads carry
as much semantic conent as other heads; they describe sensorimotor operations,
just like other heads: so they are certainly used somewhat nonstandardly in my
interpretation. In any case, the question to consider is whether it is plausible to
think of Agr features as describing attentional operations.
I will first consider the PERSON feature, and in particular the distinction be-
tween 1ST and 3RD person. DPs carrying the 1ST person feature (e.g. I) refer to
the speaker; those carrying the 3RD person feature (e.g he, she, the man) refer to an
external agent. At least in this case, I suggest that agreement features can be very
well interpreted as descriptions of attentional operations. In the account of sen-
sorimotor processing given in Section 6, the operation through which an observer
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attends to the agent of a cup-grabbing episode is also fundamental in implementing
that observer’s ability to distinguish between himself and external agents. Recall
that action episodes are represented within the observer’s mirror system. In my
account, the circuitry in the mirror system has to be configured for execution of
actions or for perception of external actions before signals in the system can be
interpreted—and these mode-setting operations must also be construed as atten-
tional operations, which direct attention to the agent of the observed episode. So
at least with regard to the 1ST and 3RD PERSON features of AgrS, it makes perfect
sense to think of agreement features as describing attentional operations.
Whether this idea extends to other agreement features, and to AgrO as well
as AgrS, is a matter for further work. Certainly there is a plausible attentional basis
for the distinction between 1ST and 3RD PERSON at AgrO. The attentional action
through which an agent establishes himself as a reach target is very different from
that which establishes an external target. There are specialised sensorimotor path-
ways controlling actions directed towards the self, and these actions have different
dynamics from those directed externally (see e.g. Petreska and Billard, 2009; Ferri
et al., 2010). As regards the other PERSON feature, 2ND PERSON, attending to the
addressee is substantially different from attending to a third party. When a speaker
is producing an utterance, the addressee must already have been established as a
focus of attention, so rehearsing an action of attention to the addressee involves a
special kind of reattention which could plausibly be linguistically marked. There is
also some reason to suppose that the distinction between SINGULAR and PLURAL
is attentional in origin. For instance, the brain area which most plausibly encodes
syntactic plurality, the left temporoparietal junction (Domahs et al., 2012) is also ac-
tivated by attentional operations parsing a visual stimulus as a group rather than
as a single entity (Yamaguchi et al., 2000). A computational model of the attentional
origin of the singular-plural distinction is given in Walles (2010).
I will conclude with some comments about GENDER features. These features
are much more open-ended semantically than PERSON and NUMBER, and much
more language dependent (Corbett, 1991). Can these features be thought of as re-
flecting aspects of an attentional action? I think this is also plausible. The impor-
tant thing to note is that attentional actions like attend man or attend cup involve
top-down establishment of open-class object representations as well as saccades to
external points in the world. When an observer executes attend cup, he activates a
representation of a cup as a search goal, which can be matched against object repre-
sentations arriving bottom-up, so there is some way of knowing whether the action
is successful (Tomita et al., 1999; Hasegawa et al., 2000; Hamker, 2004). I suggest
that while most of the open-class properties of attentional operations are expressed
through their reafferent sensory consequences (i.e. through nominal expressions),
we can also read some of these properties from representations of the operations
themselves, which are signalled by heads. Recall my assumption that there are ‘in-
terface circuits’ linking areas evoking sensorimotor signals to a language-specific
premotor output area (see Section 7.3). These circuits are allowed to have different
capacities. I suggest that the circuit which generates linguistic reflexes of the open-
class semantic properties of deictic operations has rather limited capacity, and that
GENDER agreement features are generated through this channel.
In summary, there is some support for the sensorimotor interpretations of the
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head positions AgrS, AgrO and V. The interpretation of V is certainly plausible. The
interpretation of the 1ST and 3RD PERSON features that appear at AgrS and AgrO is
also very plausible, and again seems to provide some insight into the neural basis
of these agreement features. But more work is needed to determine whether there
are sensorimotor correlates of the other agreement features that can appear at AgrS
and AgrO.
8.4 A Sensorimotor Interpretation of V-Raising and Agreement
In Section 7.4 I suggested that the heads of XPs should be understood as describing
deictic operations ‘as they are planned’ rather than as they are evoked in sequence.
This idea, taken together with known properties of the sequence-planning mech-
anism in prefrontal cortex, led to an interesting sensorimotor interpretation of the
Minimalist device of head-raising. Now that we have sensorimotor interpretations
for the AgrS, AgrO and V heads in the cup-grabbing sentence, it is useful to re-
consider this sensorimotor account of head-raising, to see how it applies in this
particular case.
Consider the English version of the sentence, The man grabs the cup. In the
surface structure of this sentence, the subject The man appears outside the VP, and
is therefore syntactically somewhat remote from the verb. Any account of syntax
has to explain why the verb’s inflection has to agree with the subject, even though
the verb is not near the subject. The Minimalist account of head-raising explains
this by positing that the inflection -s signals an agreement feature which actually
‘belongs’ at a position above VP, where it is near the subject. It is allowed to appear
on the verb because at LF the verb ‘covertly moves’ up to the position where it
really belongs.
In my proposed sensorimotor interpretation of head-raising, the subject agree-
ment inflection on the verb is a signal of properties of the attentional action which
established attention on the agent of the cup-grabbing action. (Specifically, it sig-
nals that this operation involved configuring the mirror system for action observa-
tion rather than action execution.) The reason why the inflection is allowed to ap-
pear on the verb is that linguistic reflexes of attentional actions are generated from
the region where they are planned, and are therefore tonically active. According to
this interpretation, the phenomenon of agreement is seen as reflecting the machin-
ery through which episodes are stored in, and replayed from, working memory.
The interpretation suggests a specific neural mechanism which accounts for the
syntactic phenomenon of subject-verb agreement, as it is accounted for within the
Minimalist model.
Most models of syntax include a device allowing agreement features to spread
through a syntactic structure. For instance, this is achieved through unification op-
erations in models like HPSG, Tree-Adjoining Grammar and Combinatory Categorial
Grammar. Does my proposed sensorimotor interpretation of agreement apply equally
well to the account of agreement features given in these other frameworks? I
think there are two aspects of the Minimalist account which make it a particu-
larly good vehicle for expressing this sensorimotor interpretation of agreement.
Firstly, the Minimalist model envisages head movement taking place at a language-
independent level of syntactic representation. The suggestion that deictic opera-
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tions interface with language through a planning medium where they are tonically
active makes no reference to particular languages; the Minimalist device of express-
ing movement at a language-independent level of syntactic representation is there-
fore particularly appropriate. Secondly, a Minimalist LF structure can be neatly
interpreted as a description of a sequence of operations. It is therefore particularly
suitable for expressing an account of agreement phenomena grounded in a neural
model of prepared sequences.
8.5 A sensorimotor Interpretation of DP movement, Case and Thematic Roles
There are two kinds of movement at LF: movement of heads to higher head posi-
tions, and movement of argument DPs to Case-assigning positions. In this section
I will consider what sensorimotor interpretation can be given to DP movement.
The Minimalist account of DP-raising supposes that the argument DPs of a
verb initially appear at positions within the VP. In our example, the subject of grabs
appears at the specifier of VP and its object appears at the complement. At these
structural positions, the verb’s arguments are assigned thematic roles: the specifier
assigns AGENT role and the complement assigns PATIENT role. But Minimalism also
requires arguments to be assigned ‘Case’. Case can only be assigned by functional
heads above VP: the heads AgrS and AgrO assign nominative and accusative Case
to their specifiers respectively. So the subject and object DPs must raise to these
specifier positions.
As with the other theoretical devices in Minimalism, the principle which re-
quires arguments to raise to Case-assigning positions is justified purely through
the formal role it plays in a complete model of syntax which neatly accounts for a
large body of linguistic data. The idea that argument DPs must have Case is simply
stipulated: there is no proposal about what Case ‘is’, in the same way as there is
no proposal about what specifiers and complements ‘are’. (Or rather, it is assumed
that the principle ‘DPs must raise to Case-assigning positions’ corresponds to some
neural mechanism, but there are no proposals about what this might be.) Does the
sensorimotor interpretation of LF allow us to say anything about this principle?
Case Assignment I suggest that there is a very clear sensorimotor interpretation
of the principle that DPs must raise to get Case. So far I have argued on several
grounds that the functional projections AgrSP and AgrOP describe actions of at-
tention to the agent and the target of the cup-grabbing episode, while the VP pro-
jection describes the monitoring of a motor programme. In sensorimotor terms,
the requirement that the subject and object appear in AgrSP and AgrOP projections
above VP translates as a requirement about the structure of sensorimotor routines—
namely that an observer must attentionally establish the agent and target of a grab
action before he can actively monitor a motor programme involving these individ-
uals. Within a sensorimotor model, this requirement is completely justifiable in its
own right. In fact this principle is at the heart of Ballard et al.’s conception of deictic
routines. In order to monitor a motor programme involving multiple participants,
in Ballard et al.’s model, an observer must first attend to these participants, one by
one, to set up the deictic representations which instantiate the free parameters of
the motor programme.
Syntactic Structures as Descriptions of Sensorimotor Processes 29
If we are thinking about LF in sensorimotor terms, we can now give a very
clear account of the functional projections which assign Case to DPs. These XPs
describe the attentional operations which establish the conditions under which the
motor programme can be monitored. The general principle that Case is assigned
‘by a functional head to its specifier’ (which is an important part of the Minimalist
account of Case) also has a very clear sensorimotor interpretation. A functional
head describes an action of attention, and its specifier describes the deictic repre-
sentation which this action results in. The deictic representation clearly depends on
the action of attention. I suggest this dependence is the basis for the Minimalist
idea that a specifier depends on, or is licensed by, its head.
Thematic Role Assignment Now that we have a sensorimotor interpretation of
the ‘higher’ subject and object positions above VP, can we find an interpretation of
the subject and object positions within VP, the specifier and complement of VP? In
Minimalism, these are the positions where the verb’s arguments receive ‘thematic
roles’ (namely AGENT and PATIENT). What can we say in sensorimotor terms about
these positions? Again, the sensorimotor interpretation of LF seems illuminating.
The VP projection describes the cycle of the deictic routine in which the grab action
is dynamically monitored. During this cycle, as discussed in Section 6.3, new rep-
resentations of the agent and the target become active, in new modalities connected
with the motor system. While action-monitoring is under way, a representation of
the agent as an animate entity is activated as a reafferent side-effect. And when
action-monitoring is complete, a representation of the target as a goal motor state
becomes active. These points in the routine are described by the specifier and com-
plement of the VP respectively. I suggest that the sensorimotor interpretations of
these VP-internal positions explain why they assign the thematic roles they do—
and also help us to understand the semantics of thematic roles by showing how
they are grounded in sensorimotor representations (in concrete cases such as ours).
The AGENT role is assigned by the specifier of VP because this position describes
an animate representation of one of the action participants: and the meaning of
‘AGENT’ in this context comes largely from the nature of this animate representa-
tion. The PATIENT role is assigned by the complement of VP because this position
describes an affordance-based representation of the other action participant: and
the meaning of ‘PATIENT’ in this context likewise derives largely from the nature of
this representation.
DPMovement Finally, we have to seek a sensorimotor interpretation of the Mini-
malist mechanism by which arguments ‘move’ from their VP-internal positions to
their Case-receiving positions. In the Minimalist model this mechanism is entirely
distinct from the mechanism by which verbs raise to higher head positions. We
already have a sensorimotor account of verb raising. Can we give an account of DP
raising?
Given the ideas suggested in this section, it is clear that the sensorimotor
account of DP-raising should relate to the fact that both the agent and target are
represented twice, in different modalities, in the course of the deictic routine in-
volved in experiencing the cup-grabbing episode. None of these representations
are tonically active during the routine, so their appearance at multiple positions in
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LF is certainly due to a mechanism distinct from that underlying head-raising.
My suggestion is that the Minimalist device of DP-raising reflects the asso-
ciative neural mechanisms through which representations of the agent and target
in different modalities are tied together to form multimodal representations. There
must be circuitry enforcing certain axiomatic correspondences between represen-
tations in different modalities. To create a multimodal agent representation, there
must be circuitry linking the reafferent signal activated during action monitoring
with the reafferent signal activated by the first action of attention. These two signals
axiomatically represent the same object: the agent. To create a multimodal target
representation, there must be circuitry linking the reafferent motor state active at
the endpoint of the action with the reafferent signal activated by the second action
of attention. Again these axiomatically represent the same object: the target. Note
that these circuits must link representations purely in virtue of their structural posi-
tions in the deictic routine. I will not discuss how they might be implemented neu-
rally, but I do suggest that there must be such circuits to explain how multimodal
object representations are learned, and that these circuits provide a plausible neu-
ral basis for the Minimalist account of DP raising, which links particular structural
positions within LF.
8.6 A Sensorimotor Interpretation of the Generative Mechanism
In Minimalism, LF structures are produced by a generative mechanism. The set of
possible LF structures is infinite, so they cannot be enumerated: instead this set is
defined indirectly, by characterising the mechanism which creates these structures.
I have suggested a sensorimotor interpretation of complete LF structures. But it is
also important to have some account of ‘the mechanism which produces all possible
LF structures’. What might this correspond to in the sensorimotor model?
It is hard to find a direct sensorimotor interpretation for the generative mech-
anism as it is proposed in Minimalism. The mechanism defined in the Minimalist
model proceeds from the bottom up: the lowest projection at LF is created first,
and higher XPs are successively adjoined to this. (In our example, the VP would
be created first, and then merged successively with AgrOP and AgrSP.) If a right-
branching LF structure describes the representation of a temporal sequence, as I
suggest, then the Minimalist generative mechanism describes a process whereby
this representation is assembled in reverse, beginning with the last elements. I can-
not see anything in the sensorimotor model which corresponds to this process.
The model includes an account of sensorimotor sequences being stored in work-
ing memory, but these sequences are stored, and replayed, in the order they are
experienced.4 While there is a good sensorimotor interpretation of the LF structure
produced at the end of a derivation, I suggest there is no good interpretation of the
generative process understood as a procedural mechanism.
To be clear: I do not want to say that the Minimalist generative mechanism
‘does not describe neural processes’. I only want to say that it does not describe
neural processes when understood as a procedural mechanism. The Mininalist gen-
4 The only evidence I am aware of for reversed replay of experienced sequences is in studies of
hippocampal representations of spatial location (Foster and Wilson, 2006; Diba and Buzsa`ki,
2007).
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erative mechanism creates representations (LF structures) which I argue describe
neural processes in considerable detail. And there are certainly components of the
generative mechanism which pick out well-defined features of these processes. To
take an example, consider the Minimalist idea that constituents ‘move’ from lower
to higher positions within an LF structure while it is being derived. In one sense,
I am saying that there is no such thing as ‘movement’ of constituents within LF. I
do not think there is any neural mechanism corresponding to movement as such.
But as already argued, I think there are good sensorimotor interpretations of the
structures in LF which result from movement in the Minimalist account.
Of course, we still need to give a sensorimotor account of ‘the mechanism
which produces all possible LF structures’. This is a central component of the
Minimalist model of grammar. But a sensorimotor account of this mechanism will
be quite a radical departure from the Minimalist account. I will conclude this sec-
tion by considering what this account will look like.
What are the constraints on possible LF structures, if these are thought of in
sensorimotor terms? In the sensorimotor interpretation of LF, a right-branching LF
structure describes a replayed sequence of sensorimotor operations. If we want to
characterise the set of possible LF structures, we must specify in general what se-
quences of sensorimotor operations are possible. We have already seen that there
are several general constraints on the sequences of sensorimotor operations an ob-
server can execute. For instance, an observer cannot execute a motor routine with-
out having attended to the participants involved (Section 8.5); an observer cannot
attend to a target object before having attended to the agent (Section 6.1). These are
the kinds of sequencing constraint which feature heavily in Ballard et al.’s model
of deictic routines. So part of a sensorimotor account of the generative mecha-
nism will probably involve enumerating constraints resulting from the embodied
nature of cognitive processing, of the kind studied by Ballard et al. But there are
also properties of LF structures which the sensorimotor model sees as reflecting
properties of the working memory mechanism which allows an observer to store
and replay the deictic routines he experiences (Section 7.4) and properties of the
associative mechanisms which support the creation of multimodal object represen-
tations (Section 8.5). And finally, there are properties of LF structures which are
suggested to reflect the nature of the interface circuits linking sensorimotor areas of
the brain to a language output area (Section 7.3).
In summary, the ‘sensorimotor’ characterisation of the space of possible LF
structures will be partly an account of the constraints on the sequential structure
of deictic routines, partly an account of the neural mechanisms which store and
replay these routines, and which exploit the structure of these routines to learn
basic object representations, and partly an account of the neural interfaces between
sensorimotor and language areas. Note that the first two parts of this account of
LF structures are essentially accounts of embodied sensorimotor cognition: they do
not make any reference to specifically linguistic representations or mechanisms at
all. The only references to specifically linguistic representations are in the account
of interface circuits.
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9 A Minimalist-Inspired Model of Language Processing and Language Learning
9.1 The Minimalist Account of the LF-PF Interface
In Minimalism, the surface form of a sentence (its PF) is read from the terminal
nodes of its LF structure during derivation, in a process called ‘spellout’. The rules
governing spellout are language-specific: an infant growing up in a particular lan-
guage community has to learn a set of rules particular to this language. The rules
to be learned relate to the positions at which constituents are pronounced. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.2, the LF of our example sentence contains two copies of the
agent and patient and three copies of the inflected verb: at PF there is only one
copy of each. The Minimalist proposal, in a nutshell, is that ‘surface’ syntactic dif-
ferences between languages result from different conventions about which copy of
these repeated elements is overtly pronounced.
The Minimalist account of the interface between LF and PF plays two related
roles within the overall theory. Firstly, it contributes to a parsimonious model of the
differences between languages. These differences are attributed to the mechanism
which maps between LF and PF representations. Thus, for instance, we can give
an account of languages with different constituent orderings (Subject-Verb-Object
versus Verb-Subject-Object and so on) in a way which localises these differences to
a single module of the grammar. Secondly, because differences between languages
are localised to the LF-PF interface, we can tell a relatively simple story about the
learning mechanisms which allow infants to acquire their native language. The
mechanism responsible for creating LF structures is assumed to be largely innate.
(We are allowed to assume this because LF structures are language-invariant.) In
order to learn the syntax of their native language, infants only need to learn how
to map LF structures to PF structures. The space of possible hypotheses to test is
relatively small and well-structured: the infant just needs to learn the values of
a small number of discrete parameters—for instance, whether to pronounce the
subject ‘high’ or ‘low’.
9.2 Problems with the Minimalist Account
While the Minimalist account of PF is neat in several respects, there are several
well-known problems with it. I will mention three of these.
Firstly, it is hard to square the Minimalist account of PF with an account of
sentence processing—that is, with an account of the psychological processes which
take place in a speaker producing a sentence, or in a hearer interpreting a sen-
tence. While research into sentence generation and interpretation is still at a fairly
early stage, there is good reason to think that both processes are at some level
‘incremental’—i.e. that syntactic representations are generated in roughly the or-
der they are produced in (for generation) or heard in (for interpretation). For in-
stance, there is evidence that speakers create representations of early constituents
of a sentence first, so that they can begin talking while still in the process of plan-
ning later constituents (see e.g. Levelt et al., 1999); likewise, hearers start to gen-
erate interpretations of a sentence as soon as the earliest constituents are heard
(see e.g. Tanenhaus et al., 1995). Minimalist derivations happen from the bottom
up, as discussed in Section 8.6. Since the bottom of an LF structure corresponds
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to the end of a sentence at PF, and PF structures are read from LF structures, it
is hard to see the derivational mechanism understood as a procedure as a representa-
tion of sentence processing mechanisms. Minimalist theorists frequently assert that
Minimalist models describe neural processes (see e.g. Marantz, 2005; Hornstein,
2009), but these assertions tend to be about the general nature of structure-building
computations in language rather than about the way these computations are or-
dered.
Secondly, Minimalism has no account of linguistic structures that are defined
in the surface form of sentences. In several syntactic frameworks (see e.g. Fillmore
et al., 1988; Goldberg, 1995), descriptions of linguistic structures can include refer-
ence to particular surface words as well as to abstract syntactic categories. Some
aspects of linguistic structure certainly seem well described in terms of abstract
syntactic categories like VP and DP, which are defined recursively and hierarchi-
cally. But other aspects seem best modelled simply as patterns involving partic-
ular word forms. The clearest examples of such patterns in language are idioms:
phrases like how’s it going or by and large, which appear to deliver a meaning col-
lectively, rather than individually. The main problem for Minimalism, as forcefully
argued by Jackendoff (2002), is that idiomatic linguistic structures appear to inter-
act with abstract grammatical structures in ways which are hard to model if all
structure is assumed to be created at LF. For instance, it is sensible to analyse the
verb phrase take X to task as a grammatical phrase featuring certain specific word
forms, in virtue of which it receives a conventionalised meaning (‘criticise X’). The
phrase conforms to a regular syntactic pattern, and the position X can be occupied
productively by any DP, but the word stem take and the words to and task cannot
be varied productively: the phrase has the meaning it does because it features this
pattern of specific words. Minimalist analyses have difficulty modelling partially
idiomatic constructions of this kind, especially when the idiomatic elements are
discontinuous, as in this example.
Thirdly, the Minimalist model of learning is unlike any other account of learn-
ing in current cognitive science. Theories of how humans learn in cognitive science
are normally expressed as computational models: for instance neural networks or
Bayesian reasoning systems. A central insight gained over the last twenty years
or so is that these computational models are very powerful—certainly powerful
enough to learn rich representations of surface structures in natural language with
very little prior knowledge (see e.g. Pantel and Lin, 2002). A simple type of neu-
ral network called a simple recurrent network can learn rich representations of
the sequential patterns in surface language (Elman, 1990, Christiansen and Chater,
1999). Experiments with computational learning systems lend support to ‘empiri-
cist’ models of language acquisition, which posit that infants use general-purpose
learning mechanisms to acquire syntax, rather than elaborate innate knowledge.
The empiricist model of development is supported by evidence that infants’ earliest
syntactic constructions are defined around particular lexical items, and are there-
fore idiomatic in nature (see e.g. Lieven et al., 1997; Tomasello, 2003). According
to empiricist models, infants learn adult syntax by progressively abstracting away
from concrete constructions featuring specific words (see e.g. Tomasello, 2003;
Macwhinney, 2005).
To some extent, these difficulties facing the Minimalist model all stem from
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the way it construes the ‘generative mechanism’ defining the space of well-formed
sentences. The fact that LF structures are generated from the bottom up makes the
mechanism unsuitable as the basis for an account of sentence processing. The lack
of an account of sentence processing makes it hard to express the Minimalist model
of infant syntactic development as a computational mechanism. (Computational
models of syntactic development are typically also processing models, which re-
ceive their training sentences incrementally, word by word.) The lack of a compu-
tational account of learning in Minimalism in turn limits what the theory can say
about surface structures in language, since these are best analysed as the product
of a learning mechansism.
I have argued that the Minimalist model of LF supports an interesting ac-
count of the neural basis of syntactic representations, grounded in an account of
sensorimotor processing and working memory. But I have also argued (Section 8.6)
that in order to formulate this account, we must abandon the Minimalist model of
derivation, because it does not square with the sensorimotor interpretation of LF
structures. This opens the way for an account of the relationship between LF and
PF structures which is more compatible with models of sentence processing and
syntactic development. In the next section, I will introduce a new computational
model of sentence processing and syntactic development, whose form is inspired
by empiricist models of language processing and language learning, but which also
retains the Minimalist conception of LF—interpreted in sensorimotor terms—and
the Minimalist idea of parameter-setting.
9.3 An Account of Language Processing and Language Learning
My sensorimotor interpretation of LF puts us in a position to address all three prob-
lems described in the previous section. Firstly, and most importantly, it provides an
ideal basis for an account of sentence processing. Its central claim is that the LF of a
sentence describes a neural process: namely the process of replaying an episode rep-
resentation held in working memory. In this section I will propose that the neural
mechanism which implements the described replay process is also the mechanism
through which the sentence is produced—or at least, a central part of this mechanism.
In the paper so far I have argued that thinking of LF as a describing a replayed sen-
sorimotor sequence helps us express Minimalism’s essentially declarative account
of syntactic structure in a way which makes reference to neural mechanisms. I now
want to suggest that a sensorimotor conception of LF has the additional advantage
of supporting an interesting account of sentence processing.
Until now, the working memory mechanism which allows an experienced
sensorimotor sequence to be stored and replayed has not been thought of in rela-
tion to language processing at all. The mechanism was introduced in Section 7.1 as
part of a model of long-term memory for episodes: it provides a means for buffer-
ing experienced episodes so they can subsequently be stored more permanently
in the hippocampus (and later still in cortex). It is possible to imagine this whole
mechanism predating language altogether. I will begin by sketching an account of
language evolution in which the replay mechanism did indeed predate language,
and was co-opted by evolution for a new role in communication, supporting the
production of word sequences and the learning of syntax. Then I will introduce a
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neural network model of the circuitry that evolved to co-opt the replay mechanism.
Background Assumption: Two Stages of Language Evolution In Section 7.3 I
envisaged a point during human evolution when a collection of ‘interface circuits’
evolved, allowing agents to produce overt behavioural reflexes of their internal
sensorimotor representations (see Section 7.3). These circuits allow agents to learn
a vocabulary of atomic behavioural symbols. Several theories see the evolution of
such circuits as the first major step in the evolution of human language (see e.g.
Bickerton, 1995).5 In many accounts, these circuits support the production of se-
quences of atomic behaviours, to enable an open-class vocabulary of behavioural
symbols, and to permit the production of multi-symbol utterances (see in particu-
lar Jackendoff, 1999). I will assume interface circuits support sequential behaviours
in this way. However, when interface circuits first evolved, I assume they were
not used in any systematic way together with the working-memory episode re-
play mechanism. For instance, they may originally have permitted behavioural
reflexes of an agent’s current sensorimotor signals, rather than of sensorimotor sig-
nals retrieved from working memory. I now suggest that at some later evolutionary
point, a second piece of language-related neural circuitry evolved, which allowed
agents to produce sequentially structured behavioural signals conveying detailed
information about whole episode representations rather than just about individual sen-
sorimotor signals. I engisage that this circuitry co-opted the working memory re-
play mechanism. The replay operation generates a pattern of sensorimotor signals
whose serial structure reflects the structure of the episode being replayed. Via the
interface circuits, it also generates a sequential pattern of signals in the premotor
output medium, as discussed in Section 7.3. These signals still need to be converted
into overt motor movements. My suggestion is that the circuit which evolved to co-
opt the replay mechanism for a communicative purpose transforms the sequence
of signals evoked in the premotor medium during replay into an overt sequence of
motor movements.
The Control Network The interface circuits which allow behavioural reflexes of
sensorimotor signals generate premotor movement signals. These signals do not
necessarily result in overt movements, but in general the most active premotor sig-
nal will be selected for overt execution (see e.g. Fagg and Arbib, 1998). However,
even a strongly activated action signal in premotor cortex can be withheld, if the
agent has learned a cognitive control strategy which demands this (see Cohen et al.,
2013 for a review). In the model I propose, the network which co-opts the replay
mechanism for a communicative purpose learns a control strategy which selects
just a subset of the premotor signals activated during replay for actual execution. I
will call this network the control network.
The control network’s purpose is to produce behavioural representations of
replayed episodes which are short and efficient. Recall that there is considerable
redundancy in the signals evoked in the premotor output medium when the cup-
grabbing deictic routine is replayed from working memory. There are two acti-
vations of a signal reflecting the agent, two activations of a signal reflecting the
5 There are also alternative theories; see e.g. Wray (1998).
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patient and a constant activation of a signal reflecting the whole deictic routine as
it is planned. Only one version of each of these signals needs to be expressed be-
haviourally, provided there is a convention about which versions are expressed.
The role of the control network is to learn and implement these conventions.
In Minimalist terms, the control network can be thought of as the device
which maps LF structures onto PF structures. The repeated activations of sen-
sorimotor signals during replay of a working memory episode correspond to the
multiple copies of subject, object and inflected verb at different positions in LF (see
Section 8). In the Minimalist model, infants must learn which copy of each repeated
element should be pronounced: this is exactly what is learned by the control net-
work.
If we consider which brain region might plausibly implement the control net-
work, an interesting candidate is Broca’s area. There is good evidence that Broca’s
area and surrounding prefrontal regions play a role in syntactic processing, par-
ticularly during sentence generation (see e.g. Bookheimer, 2002). However, they
also have a role in implementing cognitive control strategies. In fact, the clearest
effect of damage to Broca’s area itself is impaired cognitive control: ‘an inability to
override habitual or prepotent response behaviours’ (Novick et al., 2005). The role
I envisage for the control network is precisely to override prepotent behavioural
signals in premotor cortex, so it is natural to localise it in Broca’s area.
ANeural Network Model of Sentence Generation I will now outline a model of
the control network, and its interaction with the episode rehearsal mechanism and
the interface circuits. The overall model is a neural network of sentence genera-
tion. A diagram showing its basic architecture is shown in Figure 9. The model is





























Figure 9: A neural network model of the episode rehearsal system, the interface circuits
and the control network
The model is trained on pairs of episodes and sentences, which are shown in
red in Figure 9. Each training episode is a representation of a transitive motor ac-
tion, stored as a planned deictic routine. When replayed, this produces a sequence
of episode context representations, and a sequence of reafferent representations of
the agent and target of the action (see Section 7.2). Each training sentence is repre-
sented as a replayable sequence of words, stored in the phonological input buffer.
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Thus episodes and sentences are stored in separate media in working memory, but
these media interact, as envisaged by Baddeley (2000).
The interface circuits, here called the ‘interface network’, are shown in green.
The interface network maps sensorimotor signals onto premotor behavioural sig-
nals. I will assume these premotor signals are articulatory plans—i.e. word forms,
or ‘words’ for short. The interface network is trained by an error signal (‘match’
in the figure) which compares the words it predicts from its sensorimotor inputs
to words in the training sentence replayed from the phonological input buffer. I
assume words in the phonological input medium are also represented as articula-
tory plans (see e.g. Goldstein and Fowler, 2003) and can therefore be matched to
articulatory plans in the output modality.
The interface network can learn to generate a single word from an input sen-
sorimotor signal, but it can also learn to generate a sequence of words from a single
sensorimotor input, as envisaged in the models of Bickerton and Jackendoff. This
is achieved through the use of a recurrent context representation: the current sen-
tence context. A recurrent context representation is used in some form in almost
all neural network models of sentence processing. It holds a representation of the
sequence of words processed so far, shaped by learning to support prediction of the
next word. After each word is generated, the current sentence context is updated
to reflect the generated word, and the phonological input buffer advances to the
next word, giving the network an opportunity to learn the word which follows the
generated word.
The control network, which learns to select a sequence of premotor outputs
for overt execution, is shown in blue. This network learns to produce a binary
control signal (‘stop’ or ‘go’) as a function of the current context representation in
the episode rehearsal system—the current episode context. This is a representation
of ‘sensorimotor context’ rather than sentence context: it is updated at each cycle
of episode rehearsal as discussed in Section 7.2. The control network is also trained
by the ‘match’ signal, but in a different way. If the predicted next word matches
the actual next word in a given context, the control network learns to permit words
to be overtly pronounced in this context, and causes the input buffer to advance to
the next word. If the predicted word does not match, the network learns to refrain
from pronouncing words in this context, and does not advance the input buffer.
The control network learns language-specific conventions about when to ‘read out’
words. The conventions it learns depend on the constituent order (SVO, VSO, SOV
etc) of the sentences it is trained on.
The full model alternates between two modes of iteration. In one mode, the
control network iterates through episode contexts until it reaches a context where
a word can be pronounced. The interface network then produces as many words
as it can from the current sensorimotor signal, iterating to a new sentence context
after each word produced. When it cannot confidently predict the next word, the
control network takes over again. The effect of this interaction between the two
networks is to combine a fairly traditional empiricist model of sentence processing
and sequence learning with a recognisably Minimalist model of parameter setting.
If we interpret LF structures as describing replayed deictic routines, then the con-
trol network can be interpreted very straightforwardly as a computational model
of the mechanism through which infants learn to map LF onto PF representations.
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(Note that the control network learns a function which makes no reference at all
to the content of words—it only refers to context representations expressing the
current state of an episode being replayed. The rules it learns are abstract struc-
tural rules, like those proposed in Minimalism.) At the same time, the recurrent
component of the interface network allows it to learn rich representations of sur-
face structure in the training data. The sentence context is updated after each word
is produced. With training, the interface network can learn to map a single sen-
sorimotor signal onto an idiomatic sequence of words. More interestingly, it also
allows the learning of constructions involving a mixture of idioms and productive
syntax, for instance ‘discontinuous’ idioms like take X to task. Another interest-
ing point to note is that the model can be configured so that it learns item-specific
idiomatic constructions first, and productive syntactic rules later, consistent with
empiricist accounts of syntactic development (Lieven et al., 1997; Tomasello, 2003;
Macwhinney, 2005). The details of these results, as well as of the architecture and
training of the network, can be found in Takac et al. (2012).
The model just described is very preliminary; it must of course be scaled up
and extended in several directions. My main point in presenting it here is just to
emphasise that thinking about LF as a description of a replayed deictic routine is
not only helpful in suggesting a neural basis for the representations of syntactic
structure proposed within Minimalism: it also allows the Minimalist model of syn-
tactic structure to be stated in a way that is broadly compatible with empiricist
accounts of sentence processing and language learning, and of the role of surface
structures in language. The network presented here is an example of one such ac-
count.
10 Discussion
The aim of this paper is to express a ‘linking hypothesis’ connecting syntactic rep-
resentations, as motivated within linguistic theory, to neural mechanisms, as mo-
tivated by experiments in psychology and neuroscience. The approach I have
taken is to look in detail at a single example sentence, reporting a specific con-
crete episode, and at the sensorimotor process through which this specific episode
is apprehended. My aim is to express a linking hypothesis which connects the detail
of a sensorimotor model to the detail of a syntactic model. At the same time, I have
expressed the hypothesis in very general terms, so that it makes predictions which
extend beyond this particular example to other concrete sentences. As discussed
in Section 5, in the domain of concrete sentences the linking hypothesis assumes
that any right-branching LF structure describes a sequence of deictic operations.
This hypothesis was extended in later sections. I proposed in Section 7.4 that any
right-branching LF structure which is a domain for head-raising describes a se-
quence of deictic operations as it is replayed from working memory storage. And
I proposed in Section 8 that any Case-assigning projection describes an attentional
action establishing a participant in a sensorimotor routine, and that any instance of
DP-raising reflects associative neural mechanisms involved in learning multimodal
object representations. In fact, as discussed in Section 1, I am also committed to
extending these general proposals beyond the domain of concrete sentences. The
point of studying the sensorimotor domain first is simply to develop hypotheses
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about neural mechanisms in an area where these are relatively easy to study, so
that we can later approach other domains with some idea of what we are looking
for.
Pursuing these general proposals obviously forms the basis for a whole pro-
gramme of research at the interface between theoretical syntax and neuroscience.
There are many interesting directions to puruse, some of which are discussed in my
book (Knott, 2012) and some of which form part of ongoing work. I will not dis-
cuss these here, but instead will conclude with some thoughts about the research
programme as a whole: how the proposals square with recent developments in
Minimalism, how they relate to existing cognitive interpretations of syntax, and
how they can be extended beyond concrete sentences.
10.1 A Sensorimotor Interpretation of Merge?
As noted in Section 3.2, in modern Minimalism the X-bar schema is not the prim-
itive recursive building block of LF structure; the structures formerly associated
with X-bar schemas are now derived from applications of the more basic operation
Merge (Chomsky, 1995a). Merge is an operation that combines two syntactic ob-
jects α and β into a single new object, and labels this object with the constituent
α, as shown in Figure 10. In this operation, α plays the role of a head in X-bar
α β
α
Figure 10: The Merge operation
theory. By applying two successive Merge operations, a structure akin to an XP
schema can be created: the complement is joined to the head in the first Merge
operation, and the specifier is joined to the result in a second Merge operation. A
key difference is that in a Merge-based system, complements and specifiers are not
primitives; rather they are defined as positions in structures created by particular
combinations of Merge operations.
Is there a sensorimotor interpretation of Merge consistent with my proposed
interpretation of the X-bar schema? My earlier suggestion was that an X-bar schema
describes a context-updating deictic operation, activated as part of a deictic routine
replayed from working memory: the operation is executed in an initial context,
generates a reafferent sensory signal, and results in a new context. If there is a sen-
sorimotor interpretation of Merge, it must reconstrue this replay process, identify-
ing some of its more basic components. I should reiterate that since an LF structure
describes a process in my interpretation, not a declarative mental representation,
the structure formed by Merge will not be interpreted as describing a single static
mental representation, constructed from two component mental representations.
Rather it will be interpreted as describing a basic unit of spatiotemporal structure
in a replayed deictic routine, and its constituents will be interpreted as describ-
ing specific sensorimotor signals activated in the course of such a routine. The key
question, then is what these signals might be, and what relationships between them
might be encoded by the minimal unit of structure created by Merge.
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One possible way to interpret the structure formed by a Merge operation is
with reference to the associative brain mechanisms that implement the storage of
a sequence of deictic operations, and enable its replay. As discussed in Section 7.2,
these mechanisms make use of a dynamically updating representation of context.
One mechanism associates an initial context representation c with a deictic opera-
tion O, so that activating c triggers activation of the operation O. The other asso-
ciates the operation O—in the current context c—with another sensorimotor signal
S. These mechanisms interact: when c becomes active, this activates O; the com-
bination of c and O in turn activates S. Now consider the structure in Figure 10,
where a head constituent α is merged with another constituent β. One possible in-
terpretation is that α describes a sensorimotor operation O, β describes some other
sensorimotor signal S, and the constituent formed by merging α and β describes
the context c, which triggers operation O, and then enables a subsequent associa-
tion between O and the signal S. This constituent ‘represents the combination of
α and β’ in that the context it describes enables an associative connection between
the signals described by α and β. Its being ‘labelled’ with the head constituent α re-
flects the fact that the context it describes directly activates the signal described by
α. This interpretation makes sense both in the case where the signal S is a reaffer-
ent consequence of the deictic operation O, and in the case where S is an updated
context representation, which can in turn activate the next deictic operation.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a detailed sensorimotor inter-
pretation of Merge. My main suggestion is that thinking of the structure created
by Merge as describing an element of structure in a cognitive process, rather than
describing a static cognitive representation with component parts, may be help-
ful in characterising Merge in neural terms. The above interpretation of Merge is
not completely satisfactory: it does not quite gel with the proposal that an X-bar
schema is derived from two successive applications of Merge. (This would imply
that an X-bar schema describes two successive deictic operations, while in the sen-
sorimotor model I am assuming, the deictic operation that activates a reafferent
signal is the same operation that triggers an updated context representation.) But
for the moment, pursuing an improved interpretation will be left as a matter for
further work.
10.2 Other Functional Projections in Minimalist Analyses
As also noted in Section 3.2, the LF structure of a clause contains several projections
that do not appear in my simple model of LF structure: these include CP, which
has a role in the syntax of questions, relative clauses and clausal complements, TP,
whose head holds the semantic features signalled by the tense inflections of verbs
or tense markers, and more recently vP, a projection headed by a light verb, that in-
troduces the VP proper. If these projections do indeed feature in LF structure—and
there is good evidence they do—my general sensorimotor interpretation of right-
branching LF structures makes clear predictions that the process of apprehending
a episode has additional stages to it, that appear at well-defined serial positions in
relation to the stages I have described. I will briefly discuss some ongoing work
exploring these predictions.
CP and TP are in the ‘left periphery’ of LF, above AgrSP; CP is higher than
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TP. The existence of these projections predicts that experiencing an episode involves
executing two sensorimotor operations in sequence before attending to the agent. My
basic proposal is that there are several cognitive operations that must be executed
in order to put the brain into a state where it is ready to evoke and rehearse a sen-
sorimotor sequence. I will consider the operation corresponding to TP first. My
suggestion is that the head of TP describes an operation that determines whether
an episode representation is to be retrieved from memory or gathered directly from
experience, through the sensorimotor system. As already noted in Section 6.1,
there is good evidence that the brain can exist in several distinct modes of con-
nectivity, implemented by large-scale brain networks (Bressler and Menon, 2010).
There is a well-studied distinction between a mode associated with memory re-
trieval and a mode associated with attention to external stimuli (see e.g. Sestieri et
al., 2011). While the cognitive operations that establish these alternative modes are
not yet well understood, they are good candidates for the operations described by
TP, which encodes the distinction between present and past sentences. Turning to
CP, I suggest that this projection may describe an even earlier mode-setting cogni-
tive operation. My focus has been on CP as it appears in sentences with sentential
complements, such as X says [that] P. My proposal is that the complementiser that
describes a cognitive operation establishing a special ‘verbal mode’, in which con-
cepts are linked to words rather than to the world. A model of this operation and
how infants learn to engage it is given in Caza and Knott (2012); see also Knott (in
press). In Knott (2012) I also briefly suggest an interpretation of CP as it appears
in questions. In this context, I suggest CP describes an operation that engages the
cognitive mode in which queries can be posed to episodic memory. (Again there is
good evidence that such a mode exists.) Question formation is traditionally seen as
involving the raising of an inflectional head to the head of CP; I interpret this type
of head-raising as a reflection of the actual mechanisms through which a query is
posed to episodic memory.
I conclude by considering vP. The proposal that VP is introduced by a vP
projection headed by a light verb makes a prediction about the process of action
monitoring that takes place at the end of a sensorimotor routine. It predicts that
action monitoring is more complex than is posited in Section 6.3: rather than being
a single continuous process, it should have two well-defined temporal stages that
occur in succession. To explore this prediction I have focussed on causative light
verbs, originally hypothesised as part of an account of the causative alternation.
Verbs undergoing this alternation can appear as transitives but also as intransitives:
an example is John opened the door / The door opened. A common account of this
alternation posits that the LF of John opened the door involves two VPs: a higher vP
headed by the verb cause, introducing a complement VP headed by open (thus John
caused [the door opened]). There is very good evidence for causative actions in the
motor system, i.e. for actions that are represented by the perceptual effects they
bring about (see Hommel et al., 2001 for a review). Lee-Hand and Knott (2013)
present a neural network model of the learning and control of actions defined by
their perceptual effects; in this model, executing such an action involves activation
of a network that controls a causative action, and then monitoring of the perceptual
consequences of this action. This sequence of processing corresponds very well to
the sequence predicted by the dual-VPs analysis. What is more, the model also
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offers an interesting sensorimotor interpretation of the special type of head raising
that allows the lower verb open to raise to adjoin to the light verb cause.
There are several other projections posited within LF that remain to be con-
sidered: VoiceP, AspP and many others. Testing predictions about these projections
is a matter for further work.
I will conclude by revisiting the agreement projections AgrSP and AgrOP.
Several theorists have suggested that these can be dispensed with given the pres-
ence of other functional projections in the clause: for instance, it has been proposed
that the head of vP can check accusative Case and the verb’s object agreement fea-
tures, and that TP can check the verb’s subject agreement features (see e.g. the
discussion in Hornstein et al., 2005:162–8). Given we do not yet have a well worked
out sensorimotor interpretation of vP and TP it is premature to assess these pro-
posals in any detail—but if the above proposals about vP and TP are on the right
track, then I suggest it is unlikely the sensorimotor interpretations of these pro-
jections overlap with those of AgrSP and AgrOP. For instance, in Lee-Hand and
Knott’s model of causative actions, the sensorimotor routine involved in executing
the action of breaking a cup involves an action of attention to the cup (correspond-
ing to AgrOP) and then activation of the causative action network (corresponding
to vP). Discrepancies of this kind can push in two directions. On one hand they
can indicate problems for the proposed sensorimotor interpretation of LF. On the
other hand they can prompt further efforts to motivate a separate AgrOP projec-
tion through syntactic argumentation. At present it is not clear which direction will
predominate.
10.3 A Reductionist Model of Syntax
The linking hypothesis I propose has a reductionist flavour: I want to explain
(some) syntactic structures in language as manifestations of nonlinguistic cogni-
tive phenomena. This is a direction which many linguists have pursued, partic-
ularly within the field of cognitive linguistics (see e.g. Lakoff, 1987; Langacker,
1987, 2008). But there are also phenomena which appear to be irreducibly syntac-
tic. A good discussion about the limits of reductionist accounts of syntax is given
by Jackendoff (2002). To take a small example, verbs with apparently similar se-
mantics can introduce different prepositions (e.g. count on vs trust in). It is hard to
see such differences as reflecting semantic differences. To take a more substantial
example, transitive verbs are able to express a wide range of semantic structures.
My cup-grabbing sentence features a verb which takes an agent and a patient, but
other transitive verbs take apparently different argument types: like takes an expe-
riencer and a stimulus, frighten takes a stimulus and an experiencer, own takes an
‘owner’ and an ‘ownee’ and so on. These verbs all project the same syntactic struc-
ture as ‘grab’, featuring positions for a subject and an object. But do they share the
same semantic structure?
To begin with I should note that my model of ‘surface language’ certainly
allows for surface syntactic idiosyncracies which have no origin in semantics, and
allows that these idiosyncracies play a large part in the grammar of a language. The
sentence generation network described in Section 9 can certainly learn the kinds
of arbitrary dependency which feature in phrasal verbs like count on and trust in.
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The question about apparent semantic diversity in the structures projected by like,
frighten, own etc is more telling. If these verbs are syntactically identical, and syn-
tactic structures are understood to reflect semantic structures, what semantic char-
acterisation of subject and object position can we give which is general enough to
apply to all these semantically disparate verbs?
My main response here is that interpreting a syntactic structure as describing
stages in a sensorimotor routine is not the same as seeing it as reflecting a specific
semantic pattern. I would certainly agree that different transitive verbs describe
eventualities of very different types, and even that these are apprehended through
operations in different cognitive modalities. All I am proposing is that there are reg-
ularities in the temporal structure of these operations, and that these are reflected
in the structure of working memory episode representations, and as a result, in
syntax.
The idea that subjects and objects are best defined with reference to the per-
ceptual processing of an episode rather than to its intrinsic semantic structure has
been suggested several times before. A common idea is that subjects describe par-
ticipants with higher ‘attentional prominence’; see for instance Langacker (2008);
Talmy (2000); also Dowty (1991). One difference in my proposal is that perceptual
processes are seen as having strong sequential structure, and subject and object
are defined in relation to this structure rather than simply in relation to promi-
nence. (In my account, both agent and patient become prominent, but at different
times.) Another difference in my proposal is that it characterises subject and object
positions at a language-independent level of syntactic representation (LF) rather
than in surface sentence structure. This is helpful in accounting for the argument
patterns of stimulus-experiencer verbs like frighten, which pose problems for most
attempts to characterise argument positions semantically. If our semantic charac-
terisations of subject and object are about positions at LF rather than PF, then we
can account for such cases by arguing that the surface object appears higher than
the surface subject at LF—and there are some good arguments along these lines (see
e.g. Pesetsky, 1995; Anagnostopoulou, 1999). Of course these arguments rescue a
theory of argument linking at the expense of more complex hypotheses about LF
structures—but at least in my approach these hypotheses make predictions about
sensorimotor processing which can be independently tested.
10.4 The Idea of Language-Independent LF Structures
My sensorimotor interpretation of LF structures also appears to make a very strong
claim about the language-independence of LF. Sensorimotor processes are uncon-
troversially language-independent, but no Minimalist would want to claim that LF
structures are fully invariant over translation: to take a famous example, John swam
across the river must translate in French to John traversa le fleuve en nageant (‘John
crossed the river swimming’), which has a clearly different LF structure. More
relevant to my cup-grabbing example, there are languages where transitive mo-
tor actions are easily or even canonically expressed in passive constructions (lan-
guages with ergative characteristics like Ma¯ori sometimes have this character; see
e.g. Harlow, 2007). Where does this leave my sensorimotor account of LF?
Of course even within a single language there are often several alternative
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ways of expressing an episode syntactically. Any model of language semantics
must rely heavily on an inference mechanism, which identifies commonalities in
the semantic contributions of sentences which paraphrase one another, such as ac-
tive and passive versions of a sentence. In relation to the sensorimotor model, this
inference mechanism can perhaps be identified with the mechanism which updates
an agent’s representation of the current context when a deictic routine is completed.
I assume an agent’s representation of context is a rich, high-dimensional structure,
which cannot be directly expressed in language. (In my model, some of the sig-
nals which provide input to this update operation have direct linguistic reflexes,
but the update operation itself is complex, and learned through long sensorimo-
tor experience.) If we allow that several sensorimotor routines can bring about
roughly the same context update operation, then perhaps we can account for cases
where LF structures are not preserved across languages by positing that languages
can encode conventions about the routines through which particular updates are
communicated. It is likely that a sizeable portion of the grammar of any language
would have to be made up of conventions of this kind—and this portion of the
grammar will probably have an ‘empirist’, construction-based flavour. But note
that the conventions encoded in any given language will not be entirely arbitrary;
they will have their origins in the alternative sensorimotor routines through which
a given episode can be experienced, and which result in a given update. So a study
of the sensorimotor system is still of use in identifying the alternative constructions
from which conventions can be formed.
10.5 Deictic Routines
Another foundational assumption of my proposal is that sensorimotor processes
are all structured as deictic routines. Does this idea stand up to scrutiny? Are
sensorimotor processes structured as sequences at a certain timescale?
Of course in many ways there is massive parallelism in sensorimotor mecha-
nisms. The account of deictic routines which I propose is quite consistent with this.
In my model, the deictic operations involved in experiencing an episode progres-
sively extend a neural circuit in which there is continuous and parallel processing.
For instance, in the cup-grabbing example, when the observer attends to the agent,
he initiates processing in a neural circuit which tracks the agent; when he attends to
the cup, he initiates processing in a second circuit which tracks the cup, which is ac-
tive in parallel with the first circuit, and in which makes use of the representations it
generates. When the observer monitors the grab action, this initiates processing in a
third circuit, which uses the representations generated by the first two circuits and
runs in parallel to them. I also assume that there is parallel activity in neural cir-
cuits before they are selected. For instance, when the observer is deciding whether
to engage the action-perception circuit or the action-execution circuit, we expect
there to be activity in both these circuits concurrently, representing their claims to
be selected.
The model of deictic routines nonetheless proposes that there are discrete
changes in the neural circuitry active during the apprehension of concrete events.
In Ballard et al.’s original conception, this general idea was mainly supported by
analyses of discrete elements of behaviour, in particular saccadic eye movements.
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But it is also supported by the recent discovery of large-scale brain networks (Bressler
and Menon, 2010), which are activated or deactivated as wholes by distinct neural
operations (Sridharan et al., 2008; Menon and Uddin, 2010), and which appear to
have hierarchical structure (Doucet et al., 2011).
10.6 Beyond Concrete Sentences
I have proposed a hypothesis linking the LF structure of concrete sentences to sen-
sorimotor mechanisms. But there are abstract sentences with the very same LF as
my example cup-grabbing sentence, for instance The company acquired a subsidiary:
in this case, the LF structure cannot describe a sensorimotor process in any direct
way. Clearly my hypothesis about concrete sentences commits me to some related
claim about sentences like these.
A well-known approach taken by linguists interested in embodiment is to
argue that abstract sentences aquire their meaning through metaphors grounded
in concrete domains (see classically Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Thus for instance
if ‘company’ is metaphorically an agent and ‘subsidiary’ is metaphorically an ob-
ject, then ‘acquire’ can have a meaning similar to the motor action ‘take’ or ‘get’.
If this idea is correct, then the sensorimotor interpretation of LF could possibly be
extended to abstract sentences by proposing that the propositions they describe are
apprehended and stored as deictic routines, operating over conceptualised or sim-
ulated objects rather than actual objects in the world. However, my feeling is that
formulating a detailed hypothesis about how abstract propositions are grounded
metaphorically in concrete domains first requires a thorough understanding of how
concrete episodes are apprehended—which we are far from attaining. As a point of
methodology, therefore, I think it may be premature to attempt a detailed metaphor-
based account of abstract sentences.
Another way of looking beyond concrete sentences is to consider sentences
that do more than report experienced episodes. Sentences can express desires, ask
questions, report memories, and do many other things: these capabilities can be
traced to particular XPs at LF, and ultimately my interpretation of LF should extend
to these XPs too. In order to move in this direction, a natural strategy is to broaden
the concept of a ‘deictic operation’, which currently applies only to sensory and
motor actions, so that it includes other types of cognitive operation—for instance,
operations which manipulate working-memory representations or which perform
storage or retrieval of material in long-term memory. Our interpretation of the X-
bar schema would then allow XPs to describe cognitive operations of this kind as
well as sensorimotor operations. If there are XPs which can plausibly be interpreted
as signalling purely cognitive operations, the LF structures in which they appear
may provide interesting ways of thinking about the sequential organisation of these
operations. The proposed interpretations of CP and TP discussed in Section 10.2 in
fact move in this direction.
11 Summary
In this paper I have made a suggestion about how the rich and complex information
received by the senses during the apprehension of a simple reach-to-grasp action
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is compressed into a linguistic representation. Obviously there is a huge amount
of compression; my main suggestion is that the basis for this compression is the
temporal structure of the sensorimotor processes—specifically, its structure as a
deictic routine. Whether this idea can be successfully extended beyond the example
cup-grabbing scenario is a matter for further work.
The proposal I have made about the interface between language and the sen-
sorimotor is expressed in terms of Chomsky’s Minimalist model. But the proposal
requires some quite radical reinterpretations to Minimalism, particularly of its ac-
count of the derivation of LF structures. These revisions allow the Minimalist
model to be supplemented with accounts of sentence processing, surface syntax
and syntactic development derived from empiricist models of language which are
normally regarded as Minimalism’s competitors. I still maintain that the Mimimalist
conception of LF provides a very helpful framework for a strong hypothesis about
how syntactic structures relate to neural mechanisms. But at the same time, this hy-
pothesis may help to restate some of the key insights of Minimalism in a way which
is more compatible with alternative conceptions of syntax which are currently more
widespread within cognitive science.
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